

THE IMPORTANCE OF MORALE IN THE MODERN
NEW ZEALAND ARMY

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE IMPORTANCE OF MORALE IN THE MODERN NEW ZEALAND ARMY, by Major Evan George Williams, 104 Pages.

The modern New Zealand (NZ) Army faces a number of challenges and changes that will place increased demands on limited army resources, one of which is soldiers. The scope of this thesis was on whether morale was critical to the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness, and if so, why. The author established definitions for morale in the modern NZ Army and for operational effectiveness as well as looked at morale's components or elements, factors that influence morale, and possible products of morale. In the final analysis, the author then analyzed whether morale would indeed be critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army from a collective viewpoint and against the modern NZ Army environment. The author concluded that morale was critical to the modern NZ Army, as it will play a key role in overcoming some of the changes and challenges that face the army. It also noted that morale was the foundation upon which the Army of the future may rely upon. The analysis mandates that an increased focus on the morale of soldiers will be required to ensure that the Army can meet these challenges or a reduction in the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army may result.

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Third, I wish to thank my wife Bernice for her outstanding support and encouragement, advice, and suggestions; for proofreading endless drafts; and for pushing me when my motivation diminished. She inspired me to undertake this project and also was a principal driving force. She also had to endure long hours on her own while I was conducting research or writing the thesis and had to create the space in the family for me to work in. Without her love and support, this thesis would never have been written.

Finally, I dedicate this thesis to the soldiers of the modern NZ Army for it is they who are the basis of the topic, it is their morale that this study reflects, and it is they upon whom the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army rests. Onward.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

This thesis has purposely chosen the masculine form when using pronouns. This is in no way an attempt to discriminate and any offense that this act may cause is not intended. It was done for ease of flow and reading. The thesis was written about the *entire* New Zealand Army, including its female population who make a valuable contribution to the service. It is therefore hoped that readers will understand this and not take offense.

This thesis was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Military Art and Science at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. As such, it was written to meet the writing styles, formats, and spellings laid down by the Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs and reflects these American style requirements. This in no way detracted from the content of the thesis, but it needs to be pointed out to those in the New Zealand Army before reading this thesis.

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May 31st, 2002

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACMP	Army Continuous Modernization Program
AGL	Automatic Grenade Launcher
ANZAC	Australian, New Zealand Army Corps
AURS	Army Unit Readiness System
CDF	Chief of Defense Forces (New Zealand)
CGS	Chief of the General Staff (New Zealand Army)
DLOC	Direct Level of Capability
EC	Employment Context
FM	Field Manual
HR	Human Resources
IMV	Infantry Mobility Vehicles
LAV III	Light Armored Vehicle, Generation Three
LOV	Light Operational Vehicles
LWD	Land Warfare Doctrine, Australian Army Series
NZ	New Zealand
NZBATT 2	New Zealand Battalion, (2nd Rotation--East Timor)
NZDF	New Zealand Defense Force
ODF	Objective Deployable Force
OLOC	Operational Level of Capability
OPRES	Operational Preparedness Reporting System
PSO	Peace Support Operations
UN	United Nations
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Morale is the greatest single factor in successful war. (1948, 372)

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*

Background

Echoing the sentiments of General Eisenhower, the broad topic of this thesis was to determine the importance of morale with regards to the operational effectiveness of the modern New Zealand (NZ) Army. Now, and in the next ten years the NZ Army faces a number of challenges; army modernization, structural and organizational changes, high operational tempo, doctrinal changes, and gender integration into the combat arms to name but a few. These challenges are reflected in documents, such as the *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement* (2001) and the future Army concept document *Army 2005: The Objective Deployable Force* (July 2000). Such challenges are expected to increase demands on limited army resources, one being its soldiers. They may take the form of increased stress levels, higher operational tempo, and retention problems, with fewer doing more and may impact on the emphasis that is attached to the maintenance of morale, both at the individual and collective or group levels. The danger that exists in that context is the soldiers' needs could be somewhat overlooked and decisions could be made with little cognizance of the impact on the morale of the lower levels of the Army.

In the next five years, NZ's military focus will almost certainly remain on peacekeeping and its associated challenges. Currently, a large portion of the NZ Defense Force (NZDF) is committed to peacekeeping, the most significant being with the United Nations (UN) in East Timor. Although the focus is likely to remain on peace support operations (PSO), there is also a need to maintain a credible military force capable of war fighting. The author's experiences before, during, and after deploying to East Timor as a company commander in the 2nd NZ

Battalion (NZBATT2), UN Transitional Authority, East Timor (UNTAET) from May to November 2000, illustrated the importance of morale and how this impacted on the unit's performance. At the same time, it highlighted the implications when a lack of attention is paid to the needs of the soldiers to improve and maintain their morale. Before the deployment, extensive and challenging training was conducted, a robust family and soldier welfare system was implemented and tested, a strong esprit de corps was established, and all levels of the unit's leadership were focused on the needs of the soldiers in terms of mission achievement. This resulted in a successful operational tour for the unit that had to endure a number of challenges including the loss of a soldier in combat, the first for the NZ Army in thirty years, and a fundamental change in its modus operandi from routine PSO to a counterinsurgency type operation. Notwithstanding, some aspects of the operational tour had a negative impact on morale and these created significant challenges for the leadership and placed an additional burden on the very busy and sometimes overworked soldiers. However, first hand experience confirmed that when emphasis is placed on morale, operational effectiveness could be maintained and even enhanced. It also illustrated the consequences of underestimating the importance of morale. Is morale therefore a critical component in the achievement of operational effectiveness? What is its relevance to the current and future NZ Army? Will morale assist the modern NZ Army overcome the challenges it faces now and in the future? What are the implications of not maintaining a good level of morale in the modern NZ Army? All these questions are summed up in the primary question of this thesis and provided the focus for the subsequent research.

Thesis Question

In line with this background, the primary thesis statement was: Is morale critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

In order to address the primary question the following subordinate questions were used as

the basis for research and analysis of the primary thesis question:

1. What is operational effectiveness in terms of a modern NZ Army?
2. What are the key elements or components of morale, the factors that influence morale, and how do they all interrelate?
3. What are the circumstances and changes that may influence morale in the modern NZ Army?

Given that the research is aimed at determining the effect morale has on the NZ Army's operational effectiveness, it was important to establish early what this means within the modern NZ Army environment or context. This required the establishment and analysis of factors that accurately define, quantify, and qualify operational effectiveness, thus allowing for the application of further research into morale and its influences on these factors. The *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement* (2001) between the NZ Defense Force (NZDF) and the NZ Government outlines a number of outputs that reflect possible deployment and employment options for the NZ Defense Force, including the Army. In essence, these range from civil defense and disaster relief through peace support operations to war fighting. The ability of the Army to meet these requirements across the full spectrum of possible deployment and employment options and be a credible employment option for the government will generally determine its operational effectiveness.

The impact of morale required analysis once the criteria of operational effectiveness had been discussed. To do this, the key factors influencing both individual and collective morale were identified. These included training, leadership and discipline, welfare, communications and information, and social and political influences. In addition, a study of the components or elements of morale was conducted to better understand its dynamics. Once these had been identified, a study of their mutual relationship was conducted in order to establish how the various factors and elements contribute to morale, and, importantly, what the products of morale

may be, such as cohesion and esprit de corps. Following this, it was necessary to establish the environment in which operational effectiveness is and will be applied and identify the likely impact, both positive and negative, on the morale of the Army now and in the future. This requires a detailed summary of the changes and challenges that the Army will undergo in the next ten years and their consequences. At the conclusion of this stage of analysis, the primary thesis question was then analyzed within the context of the modern NZ Army: Is morale critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army?

Significance of Issue

As a leader of men and possible future unit commander, I, like General Eisenhower, believe that the status of the Army's morale now and in the future is important. I also believe that the most valuable resource the Army possesses is its soldiers. Without well-motivated and dedicated soldiers, the most sophisticated weapon system is useless. General George C Marshall once said "You can have all the material in the world but without morale, it is largely ineffective" (Fitton. Ed, 1990,193) The NZ Army, like many other Armies, is losing good soldiers who are highly trained individuals. Some of the reasons given directly reflect their dissatisfaction with the system, their unit, and their own subsequent low morale. Also man-management, conditions of service, and high operational tempo are some of the reasons soldiers request release from the service. With soldiers leaving, training costs may be affected, and, more importantly, with the tempo of operations unlikely to reduce, the NZ Army is asking fewer to do more. This self-feeding cycle may have serious consequences for the future NZ Army.

In the next ten years the NZ Army will see a major shift from Light Infantry to a motorized role. In pursuit of the force as envisaged in *Army 2005, The Objective Deployable Force* (2000), the infantry will be motorized in highly technical and state-of-the-art light armor vehicles (LAV III) Infantry Mobility Vehicles (IMV). This change will also see major changes in

the structures of the battalions and the supporting arms and services. The infantry is also likely to receive highly advanced infantry support weapons, such as the Javelin Antiarmored weapon, .50-caliber machine guns, and automatic grenade launchers (AGL), along with an advanced tactical communication system. While all of these are likely to have a positive morale effect on the Army through enhancing and updating the fighting capability, they will also place pressure on those that will be required to operate these technical and advanced systems. There is also the added pressure, uncertainty, and difficulties that usually accompany change in military organizations and in an army's doctrine. All will no doubt have an impact on soldiers and their morale and the morale of the modern NZ Army, and is discussed in detail throughout this thesis.

Another factor that will be discussed is the impact of the increased operational tempo that the Army operates in now and will likely have to endure in the future. East Timor has required the Army to create a third battalion group from the artillery and armored regiments in order to meet its battalion commitment to the UN effort. This has resulted in those soldiers of traditional combat support arms having to undertake infantry training and conduct infantry operations at the detriment of their own trade and worse, the capability they are employed to provide. While an operational tour of duty can improve individual morale and develop group morale, this situation is having a degrading effect on the group morale of the various regiments involved, in particular with their inability to practise their primary role. This could have long-term effects on the modern NZ Army, in particular retention, as it undergoes modernization and change.

Another factor worth outlining prior to a more detailed study later in the thesis is the role that political and social attitude towards defense plays on the Army's morale. The previous and current governments have been criticized for their defense focus and for what many see as a lack of support for its military. This impression comes from what people see as an unwillingness to pay the soldiers of its Army salaries commensurate with the risks that its individuals are asked to take and the hardships they endure. In addition, over recent times past governments have cut

defense spending significantly, which portrayed to many the apparent lack of priority that the politicians place on defense. However, the Army has still been required by the government to conduct operations in a professional manner such as in Bougainville in 1997, the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in 1999, and East Timor in 1999. This, together with a perceived apathetic attitude of NZ society towards the NZ Army as indicated by editorials, articles, published letters to news organizations, and opinion polls has influenced the morale of the modern NZ Army in the past.

According to the CGS Vision for the Army of 2015, the NZ Army could have females making up 50 percent of its strength by 2015. The NZDF has also accepted the need to offer females employment in all arms of the forces, including those that may well see them in front line action. In June 2001, one of the infantry battalions received its first female infantry platoon commander. This is the initial stage of what will inevitably be an increase in females being employed in combat roles. This development in the NZ Army will also affect the morale of the Army, including specifically the individual and collective group morale of those combat elements concerned.

In 1995, the Army became a tribe: Ngati Tumatauenga, the “Tribe of the War God,” an initiative that was aimed at embracing both the Maori culture and the warrior spirit within the army. It has already had a largely positive impact on the morale of the army, particularly at the collective level, through the enhancement of the cohesion and esprit de corps of the service. This initiative is likely to continue to grow and become a more significant part of the army's culture in the future and will therefore continue to have a significant impact on the morale and effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

In order to meet the challenges and changes that the future holds, an increased focus on the morale of soldiers will be required to ensure that the Army can tackle them in a professional and capable manner. Failure to do so could see a reduction in the operational effectiveness of the

NZ Army in the future. By researching the many sources available in the United States, sources not available NZ, and relating findings and conclusions to the modern NZ Army, it is hoped that the Army may be reminded of the importance of morale, particularly as it enter a period of changes and challenges. It may also be possible to provide impetus for further study to develop tools and methods to improve and maintain morale in the contemporary and future NZ Army.

Key Definitions

It is vital to the research that a working understanding of morale is identified early. This is to ensure that subsequent research and analysis can be focused and relevant to the subject. Many definitions exist for morale: psychological, doctrinal, and those offered by theorists and past commanders. As a matter of course, this thesis has focused on the human dimension of morale and discussion includes reference to psychological subject material in order to define the key components of morale in the context of the human dimension of the military organization. The *Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary* (1996) definition of morale is: "The state of mind of an individual with respect to the task he or she is expected to perform -- esprit de corps" (1996, 447). Doctrinally, however, morale is defined in the Australian Army *Leadership in Theory and Practice* (1993), as

Morale is an attitude of confidence in the mind of an individual and closely related to the satisfying of a man's basic needs. If the training, administration and fight of a unit is conducted so as to assist in satisfying these needs of the group and differing individual needs, a favorable attitude will be developed. . . . High morale is a positive state of mind which gives a man a feeling of confidence and well-being that enables him to face hardship with courage, endurance and determination. (9-1)

Another favored and related definition of morale is one from John Baynes' *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* (1967). Baynes states that morale

is a quality of mind and spirit that combines courage, self-discipline and endurance. . . . in time of peace, good morale is developed by sound training and the fostering of esprit de corps. In time of war, it manifests itself in a soldier's absolute determination to do his duty to the best of his ability in any circumstances. At its highest peak it is seen as an individual's readiness to accept his fate willingly even to the point of death. (108)

These definitions have a number of similarities. They talk of morale being a *state or quality of mind*, involving *courage, determination, and endurance in the face of hardship*. They however only really define morale in its individual form. From a collective viewpoint, *Military Psychology: An Introduction*, a book edited by Christopher Cronin defines group morale as “the mental fitness and motivation of the group and its individuals” (Cronin 1988, 294). When read in the collective context, it is possible to see a relationship between morale and cohesion or esprit de corps within the military context. Collective or group morale formed the basis upon which the majority of discussion of morale and its importance in the modern NZ Army was based; however, as part of this analysis, it was important to look at individual morale and how it works to build group morale.

Baynes' definition includes reference to what constitutes good morale both in peace and war. It also reflects the opinion that morale is inherently seen as a good thing and has positive connotations. This is also reflected in the doctrinal definition through the use of the word “positive.” Some look at morale as being either present or not present as opposed to morale that is present being good or bad. This theory would tend to suggest that there is no such thing as bad morale, and that as a result, poor morale is the total absence of morale. For the purposes of this research, morale will be discussed in terms of its presence and by default; therefore, poor or bad morale is the absence of certain components of morale at the individual and collective level.

These definitions form the basis and set the parameters of a working understanding of what morale is in the context of this research. Notwithstanding, subsequent research and analysis have gone much deeper in order to identify the components that create this state or quality of mind, mental fitness, and motivation and that facilitate courage and endurance in the face of hardship. It has also looked at some of the products of good morale, such as cohesion and esprit de corps, and factors that influence morale.

For the purposes of this thesis, the term “operational effectiveness” has been chosen over

“combat effectiveness” for a specific reason. It is felt that the term “combat” is too specific when dealing in a day and age of PSO, particularly in the NZ Army's case. This is not to say that the term combat effectiveness does not have its place, especially when the Army is called on to take part in mid to high intensity operations. Operational effectiveness simply tends to be more encompassing and generic, covering the full spectrum of possible military operations that the modern NZ Army may well be involved in over the next five years and beyond. In line with this, the term “modern” encompasses the last five years and projects to encompass the next ten years. This is the definition that best reflects the scope of *Army 2005: The Objective Deployable Force* (2000), a modernization directive for the NZ Army, and the Chief of the General Staff's vision for the Army of 2015 as outlined in *Defense Force Orders (Army)* Volume 1 (2000). By modern, this thesis refers to recent past, present and near future and focuses on the influences within this timeframe. Modern does not only mean technologically advanced, or more simply put, up to date, but also discusses it from the point of view of time. This is important, as this modern period will see a number of challenges or changes that may well impact on the morale of the NZ Army. Notwithstanding, a thorough study of operational effectiveness, its definitions, its implication in terms of the NZ Army, its doctrine, and its effects has formed a large portion of the research and analysis of this thesis.

Limitations and Delimitations

One limitation of the research plan is the fact that this study focuses on the modern NZ Army and the potential lack of NZ specific material readily available in the United States. NZ doctrine was available and the intended course of research was to look at the theoretical aspects and then apply them to the Army's current and future roles as outlined by the NZ Government. The research material to establish the modern NZ Army environment and from which to assess and discuss operational effectiveness in this environment was available. A delimitation in terms

of this study is that the thesis focused on the effect of morale on operational effectiveness and, therefore, took for granted that the other components that contribute to operational success, such as firepower, maneuver, protection, and information, played a vital role in their defined form. Generally, the study did, however, attempt to relate morale and its influences to these components, particularly while discussing operational effectiveness, in order to determine the relationship they have to each other.

The question of good versus poor morale is not the focus of this study. The focus of the study is on the impact good, solid and sustained morale may have on the NZ Army as it moves into the twenty first century and a determination of whether morale is critical. As previously discussed in this chapter, by default, bad morale can be defined as the absence of good morale. The absence of those elements of good morale will surely result in bad individual or group morale with the commensurate results. This study will, therefore, not discuss in detail what constitutes poor morale versus good morale and what efforts should be made to improve or maintain good morale, or the presence of morale. To attempt this study in the context of the thesis question would be too expansive and, as such, should be the focus of further research at a later date.

In line with the above, a further delimitation of the research is that the thesis concentrated on why morale may be critical to operational effectiveness. It did not deal with the specifics regarding how morale should be maintained in the NZ Army. It did not specifically outline in detail those processes, programs, and types and styles of training and actions that must be undertaken to ensure the level of morale remains high. This area should, however, form the basis of future follow on study with particular reference to systems and methods that are available, or that can be developed in the NZ Army context.

Assumptions

In order to relate this study to the modern NZ Army, two assumptions needed to be made

to ensure a consistent environment. First, that the current *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement* (2001) between the Defense Force and the NZ Government and related documents such as *Defense Framework* (June 2001), reflect the likely defense policy direction for the next five to ten years. This included planned restructures and equipment projects, such as the LAV III and modern infantry support weapons as outlined in *Army 2005: The Objective Deployable Force* (2000). Coupled with this, the NZ Government policy of commitment to peacekeeping operations will also continue throughout the modern period. Together, these assumptions create a realistic reflection of the possible environment and level of operational tempo that the Army will have to endure. These assumptions illustrate the background upon which the effects, demands, and requirements of morale were applied.

Summary

In summary, it was intended to establish what is meant by operational effectiveness in the modern NZ Army, particularly in terms of its ability to meet its directed outputs. Following this it is important to establish the parameters upon which morale, its components and its impacts can be applied. The initial definitions for morale being a state or quality of mind, involving courage and endurance in the face of hardship, along with its associated group definition, were discussed in more detail to identify what contributes to this state or quality of mind and how courage and endurance is achieved. It is also important to look at an overview of the environment that the modern NZ Army will operate in, together with its likely impact on the morale of the Army. This total study determined what products or conditions are borne from morale and how operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army may be improved through good individual and collective morale. The result of the research was a sound understanding of the importance of the maintenance of morale and its impact on the modern NZ Army.

The Army faces a significant period of change with its inherent challenges, such as increased operational tempo, equipment enhancements, technological advancements, a number of

doctrinal shifts, political and social influences, and gender integration into the combat arms. The morale of the NZ Army may be a critical tool in ensuring the Army can undergo these changes and meet these challenges, while maintaining the ability to succeed operationally, when called upon to undertake operational deployments across the full range of military operations, including war fighting.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

It is morale of armies, as well as nations, more than anything else, which makes victories and their results decisive. (1838, 71)

Antoine Henri Jomini
Summary of the Art of War

Jomini was not the first to identify the importance of morale and in fact, this aspect of the military organization has been included in the writings of many historical leaders, philosophers, and theorists before and after Jomini. Much has been written on the subject of morale within a military context, but little has been related to the NZ Army system, especially concerning its pending future. The general trend from the majority of the material studied suggests that morale is important. The degree of importance is not necessarily so clear. Some class it as vital to the success of military organizations and the operations they conduct, while others see it as only a contributing factor to the effectiveness of military organizations. In order to determine the importance of morale, the key to the literature review was to research the current literature available on morale and its components, the factors that may influence morale, and how they interrelate. Further, in order to establish the NZ context, a review of NZ Army doctrine and development literature was conducted in order to address the primary question of morale and its impact on the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

The literature review was organized in accordance with the subordinate questions:

1. What is operational effectiveness in terms of a modern NZ Army?
2. What are the key elements or components of morale, the factors that influence morale, and how do they all interrelate?
3. What are the circumstances and changes that may influence morale in the modern NZ Army?

What is Operational Effectiveness in Terms of the Modern NZ Army?

Strategic Direction and Operational Effectiveness

A review of the strategic direction contained in NZDF 2001/2002 *Purchase Agreement* (2001) was required to determine what is operational effectiveness in terms of the modern NZ Army. This document outlines the outputs that the NZ government expects the NZ Army to produce and gives the Army the necessary strategic and service level guidance, in particular, that of the Chief of the Defense Force (CDF). In the purchase agreement, the CDF made it clear that the services must be able to operate effectively against a “resolute, regular joint force” and that they must be able to fight and win future conflicts. This document also stated subjectively that the basis for service credibility is its operational capability (2001, S1-2).

The outputs that are expected of the NZ Army include military operations across the entire spectrum of operations, from humanitarian and disaster relief to war fighting. These operations are defined as employment contexts (ECs) and reflect the specific tasks that the modern NZ Army may be called upon to perform. The purchase agreement states that a viable force would “meet the collective training standards, experience levels, and qualification requirements for military tasks” (2001, S3-39). This tends to indicate a more quantifiable and objective view of operational effectiveness in order to achieve the strategic requirements. It does intimate that an effective army would be able to operate effectively across the full range of required outputs, including winning wars or conflicts.

Operational Effectiveness and Doctrine

In order to study the question of operational effectiveness, it was also necessary to look at doctrine to identify those factors that can theoretically further quantify this topic. The capstone operational level documents that drive the NZ Army doctrine are the United States Army Field Manual 3-0 (FM 3-0), *Operations*, and the Australian Army publication Land Warfare Doctrine, Volume 1, 1999 *Fundamentals of Land Force Operations* (LWD-1). They provide the basis of

full-spectrum operations in the form of principles, tenets, and elements of combat power. These “provide the basis for the efficient and effective generation, employment and sustainment of Army Forces” (FM 3-0 2001, 4-2). The principles guide the combination of the elements of combat power (FM 3-0 2001, 4-2), the tenets describe the characteristics of successful operations (FM 3-0 2001, 4-15) and build on the principles. The principles of war contained in LWD -1 align closely to those contained in FM 3-0 apart from the inclusion of morale as a stand-alone principle of war. These, therefore, provide the basis upon which to perhaps qualify operational effectiveness in terms of the application of the principles and tenets of full-spectrum operations.

In terms of the elements of combat power, LWD -1 lists them as elements of “Fighting Power” (1999, 5-2). Fighting power describes how the army develops the capability to conduct effective operations across the spectrum and levels of conflict “high morale is central to the effective generation of fighting power” (1999, 5-15). Fighting power as outlined in LWD-1 incorporates the old elements of “combat power” (firepower, maneuver, and morale), which reflect closely those elements contained in the FM 3-0 (maneuver, firepower, leadership, protection, and information). Morale is included as a stand-alone element of fighting power in LWD-1 rather than being a component of leadership, as is the case in FM 3-0. “The ability to fight and win underlies success in all operations . . . combat power is the ability to fight” (FM 3-0 2001, 4-3). It is worthy of note, however, that according to FM 3-0, leadership, which equates to morale in Australian doctrine, is considered the most essential and dynamic combat power element (FM 3-0 2001, 4-7).

Effective Military Change Management.

The NZ Army faces a significant period of change, change that will require effective management. In *Five Star Leadership*, Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E. Gerbhardt use references from the US Marine Corps to highlight the applicability of military leadership

techniques to business leadership and business effectiveness. The need to ensure that effective leadership is exercised in situations of change is highlighted, as is the fact that initiative by all members of an organization contributes to its effectiveness as it undergoes change.

Townsend and Gerbhardt contend that change can be disruptive and disheartening to the individual and the organization, which, in turn, can lead to collective inefficiency and ineffectiveness. By creating an environment where initiative is encouraged and leadership allows this to flourish, the effectiveness and efficiency of the change process will ensure that the overall effectiveness of the business or organization is not adversely affected in the short and long terms. The human issues associated with organizational change must be taken into account throughout the process in order for the change process to succeed (Townsend and Gerbhardt 2001, 83-103). The measurement of business effectiveness is somewhat easier to quantify through profits and dividends, but the application of Marine Corps leadership techniques suggest a more subjective application of skills to enhance the quantifiable result.

Measuring Operational Effectiveness.

Having reviewed the relevant doctrine in terms of operational effectiveness it was pertinent to look for further ways to quantifiably measure effectiveness. *Measurement of Effectiveness in Marine Corps Infantry Battalions* by R. F. Hayes made an attempt to address the measurement of combat effectiveness. It primarily based this measurement on the performance of the units in the field on training exercises. It then drew conclusions on whether this can determine whether units will be successful in combat. Strong leadership played a large part in determining a unit's effectiveness and that this was required at all levels in order to ensure the unit's collective effectiveness. Responsiveness to changing situations and adaptive behavior were also key to the effectiveness of a unit (Hayes 1978, 1-3). Another large component of a unit's effectiveness was its level of cohesion, its ability to operate together and coordinate all aspects

and elements in the pursuit of mission success. The units that could maintain cohesion tended to increase their operational effectiveness (Hayes 1978, 1-3). Hayes does not make specific mention of morale and its impact but does identify some factors that influence morale and elements of morale, such as discipline and esprit de corps, as having an impact on the cohesion and, therefore, the operational effectiveness of a unit. It is also important to point out that these are not the only factor or elements identified that play a part in determining operational effectiveness. Others include effective logistics, communications, and information (Hayes 1978). Leadership and cohesion along with adaptive behavior, are more relevant to the topic of this thesis.

“Unit Cohesion and Morale in Combat” is a monograph by Major A. A. Cox, which presented a historical study of the impact good morale has on unit cohesion and the subsequent positive effects on operational effectiveness. He identified loyalty, unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and trust as some of the key components in his studies of the Waffen SS, 442d Regimental Combat Team, and the US Marine Corps. He concluded that combat effectiveness is a product of morale and cohesion and that the elements listed above contributed to these two major elements of effectiveness (Cox 1995, 41-43). From this and the conclusions made by Hayes, cohesion and leadership, along with morale, appear to play a large part in determining a unit's or organization's operational effectiveness. However, while subjective in nature, they do not provide an objective measurement of operational effectiveness. They do, however, further identify elements and determinants that can adequately define operational effectiveness.

In a book called *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Volunteer Military*, edited by Sam C. Sarkesian, a contribution by Roger A. Beaumont and William P Snyder entitled *Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes* stated that

Military effectiveness can only be obtained through control of an increasing complex system of people, machines, organizational structures, and operational doctrines. Effectiveness therefore depends heavily on how well the overall system is integrated. (1980, 36)

This illustrated the many factors that should be considered when attempting to define or quantify operational effectiveness. It went on to discuss the importance of the interrelationship among the people of the organization, in particular the leadership and their subordinates. It also made mention of the need to integrate technology effectively in order to enhance military effectiveness. In the same book, another article, by Lewis Sorley, entitled *Prevailing Criteria: A Critique*, discussed effectiveness and linked it to the measurable product produced by the US Army Unit Readiness System (AURS). Sorley's article discussed the various areas used to measure a unit's readiness: its people, organization, equipment, and its trained state in the current systems and offered an opinion as to the usefulness of the resulting readiness reports. Sorley contends that for the readiness system to better reflect a unit or military organization's readiness and possible effectiveness, other aspects need to be included in a unit readiness survey. These include those which reflect the human dimensions of motivation, commitment, leadership and influences of key people in the organization, trained performance, cohesion, and potential disintegrative factors (drugs, racial disharmony) (Sorley 1980, 73-91). Sorley contends that integrating these factors will give a better indication of a unit's readiness (1980, 91).

The AURS that Sorley refers to is similar to the NZ Army operational preparedness reporting system (OPRES), which is supposed to reflect the potential effectiveness of the unit (2001/2002 *Purchase Agreement* 2001, S1-22). It evaluates key performance areas, such as readiness, combat viability, deployability, and sustainability. Readiness measures two broad human factors: personnel continuity (key personnel appointments filled over time) and both individual and collective trained states. These performance indicators are evaluated against a performance rating scale. This scale determines what degree a unit is at in terms of its capability

to perform specific tasks and whether it is at the directed level of capability (DLOC) in peacetime or operational level of capability (OLOC). “OPRES reports to the CDF, the standards reached against the standards set as a measure of output delivery” (2001/2002 Purchase Agreement 2001, S1-22). OPRES goes some way to quantifying effectiveness but suffers from the same limitations as outlined by Sorley, Beaumont and Snyder: little cognizance is given to the human factor.

Summary

Operational effectiveness in terms of the modern NZ Army proved difficult to quantify; however, the basis may rest on the achievement of strategic direction outlined in the various documents discussed. It may also be reflective of the doctrinal foundation upon which the army fights or prepares to fight. Achieving this in a period of significant change presents further complications. It is important that a clear model of what is operational effectiveness be established in order to determine whether morale is critical to its achievement. Prior to this, however, it was necessary to look at morale in more detail and to understand the many elements, components and factors of this complex topic.

What Are the Key Elements or Components of Morale, the Factors that Influence Morale, and How Do They All Interrelate?

Many different writers have many differing views of morale and the components thereof, as well as factors and products that may influence morale. This portion of the literature review only focused on those that directly pertained to morale in a military context and that bear some relevance to the modern environment and doctrine of the NZ Army. It looked at doctrinal, historical, and psychological resources in an attempt to provide a broad understanding of the complexities of morale, its components and how they interrelate, as well as factors that may influence individual and group morale. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex subject, for ease

of research and analysis the literature review for this subordinate question was compartmentalized. It is important to note, however, that there is a significant amount of interrelationship and overlap between the two areas, and this became evident. For example, discipline and leadership may be viewed as either elements of morale or factors influencing morale, they fit equally in both areas. Factors can influence elements of morale and elements are factors that influence morale. To provide a structure to the review and analysis, the grouping of components or elements of morale and factors that influence morale was conducted. As a starting point, the literature review looked at morale from an overarching doctrinal viewpoint prior to taking a closer look at its elements or components.

Doctrinal View of Morale

According to the Australian Army's *Leadership Theory and Practice* (1993), the key element of a soldier's morale is his attitude to the army, himself, his companions, and his leader (*Leadership Theory and Practice* 1993, 9-2). It also defined another key element of morale as a unit's esprit de corps. This was a reflection of the collective morale of a unit's soldiers and was a natural progression built on the foundation of morale and discipline (*Leadership Theory and Practice* 1993 9-3). Espirit de corps is the “relating of needs, feelings and attitudes of a unit's men (the elements of that make up the foundation of morale) to the accomplishment of the mission . . . fosters faith, loyalty, pride, confidence, unity and even a feeling of invincibility--a feeling of oneness” (*Leadership Theory and Practice* 1993, 9-4). While all these were discussed as elements of esprit de corps, they are also individually and collectively, directly related to morale.

Doctrinally, FM 22-100, *Leadership* (1999), stated that high morale comes from good leadership, shared hardship, and mutual respect and that it was essentially something that cannot be measured. “High morale results in a cohesive team that enthusiastically strives to achieve common goals” (FM 22-100 1999, 3-3). In contrast, *Leadership Theory and Practice* (1993)

listed the following as factors that influence morale:

- a. Leadership
- b. The team's unity of purpose towards the achievement of team and collective objectives
- c. Discipline
- d. A sense of belonging and worth, in particular individual self respect
- e. Comradeship or mateship, including cohesion
- f. Mutual confidence in each other's abilities through training
- g. Dependent well being, including the status of a soldiers "home-front"
- h. Spiritual beliefs and needs
- i. Comfort and welfare (1993, 9-1 and 9-2).

Both doctrinal books included reference to many, but not all, of the same factors that influence soldier's and the group's morale. Leadership was listed in both, and the remaining FM 22-100 items could easily encompass those others listed in the Australian publication. With this doctrinal basis established, it was then logical to take a closer look at the elements or components of morale.

Elements or Components of Morale: A Closer Look

While in chapter 1, a working definition of both individual and collective morale was established, it was worth looking at a few other points of view when addressing the factors and elements of morale. In *Morale and its Enemies* by William Ernest Hocking (1918), Hocking states that:

What condition is to the body, morale is to the mind. Morale is condition; good morale is good condition of the inner man; state of will in which you can get the most from the machinery, deliver blows with the greatest effect, take blows with the least depression and hold out for the longest time. (Hocking 1918, 14)

Hocking also contended that morale is difficult to measure, a view held by most who are knowledgeable in the subject. He does, however, state that good morale, or its absence, is

instantly felt by those who know its signs and that there are many factors that can influence its presence and power (Hocking 1918, 18).

In the article “Morale, Crucial but what is it?” published in the June 1983 issue of *Army* magazine Major William A. Knowlton stated that “Morale is often characterized as comprising courage, discipline, self-confidence, or determination to reach a goal” (1983, 35). He went further to say that the determinants of morale “include leadership, pride in the unit, patriotism, or unit cohesion”(1983, 36). He also quoted a report of a Army Research Institute (ARI) study which believed that it was possible to measure morale by measuring what the report believed were the major components of morale: satisfaction, motivation, and group cohesion (Knowlton 1983, 35-36).

In *Fighting Spirit* (1978), Major General F. M. Richardson of the British Army identified what he believed to be the three elements of morale: the soldier's personal or individual morale, his morale as a member of a small group, and the morale of the unit as a whole. Richardson summarized personal morale as being sustained by physical factors, such as good health, good food, rest, and amenities, for example, books and laundry. He contended that the aim was to provide the best that can be provided in the circumstances. He also suggested that a number of mental factors contributed to personal morale. These were:

1. Understanding of the cause for which a soldier fights. Richardson concluded that most soldiers really fight for their families and their home, hence the importance of contact with home through mail and the media, and help with family problems.

2. Soldiers having self-confidence in their abilities and that they are better than the enemy. This was achieved through selecting the right man for the job and giving soldiers the appropriate training.

3. Soldiers having sound religious and moral belief, including self-control, self-respect, courage, endurance, and devotion to duty.

4. That the morale of officers and Non Commissioned Officers is supported by their sense of duty and responsibility and the knowledge that others rely on them and their decisions (1978, 171-172).

Richardson believed that membership of a contented team confident in its leaders, confidence in and respect for their comrades, and determination not to let down friends or the unit sustained group morale. As for unit morale, Richardson summarized this as *esprit de corps*, something that must be nurtured and fostered and, if lost, takes a long time to rebuild. Richardson defined *esprit de corps* as a sense of pride and belonging and a unity of purpose (1978, 172). Richardson neatly compartmentalized a number of common beliefs regarding morale, but his views are by no means accepted by all who have written on the topic.

In his dissertation entitled “Combat Motivation: The Human Dimension Correlates” (1990), Daniel Reeves looked at the human dimensions in a military organization and how these produce what he refers to as combat motivation. He contended that:

High morale and cohesion are related to enhanced combat performance, considered a preventative against combat stress reaction, and seen as an important element in a soldier's will to fight. They are also indicative of successful military socialization and commitment to army values and are the direct product of successful leadership. (1990, 13)

Here, Reeves attempted to link morale, cohesion, leadership and effectiveness, and his research, based on quantifiable surveys of the Israeli Army and the German Wehrmacht by many other sources that tended to support his theory. R. Gal and F. J. Manning reported in *A Portrait of an Israeli Soldier* (1986), and *Morale and its Components: A Cross-National Comparison* (1984)

that morale and cohesion not only reduced the occurrences of combat stress, but also led directly to enhanced combat performance in Israeli Army units (1984, 67). They also concluded that combat success through good combat performance enhanced unit morale and cohesion (1986, 45). This would suggest that morale, cohesion and combat effectiveness are interrelated and rely on each other.

In *Men against Fire*, S. L. A. Marshall noted that morale is the thinking of the Army, its whole body of thought (1947, 158). He claimed that at the time of his writing this work, this concept was unique. It is now a commonly held thought. Marshall discussed the effects of morale on the ability of soldiers to perform in the potentially horrific environment of close combat. It was in this environment where the true operational effectiveness of a military organization was tested, and, therefore, was the best place to gauge the value of good individual and group morale. Marshall likened morale to an individual's will to win, act with courage and endure (1947, 157). Further to this, Marshall deemed morale as a collective human emotion comprising leadership, cohesion, and communication. His thoughts on cohesion reflected his study of the replacement policy in World War II, where new recruits felt mentally lonely after arriving in a new unit as there was no formed bond between them and the soldiers who were in the unit already (1947, 42). This, Marshall concluded, had an adverse impact on the unit's effectiveness and cohesion, until these new members had been able to form a close bond. He contended that a key component of morale was the moral support offered internal to an organization: "It is that way with any fighting man. He is sustained by his fellows primarily and by his weapon secondarily" (1947, 43). This, Marshall contended, was the basis of cohesion in its simplest form. Soldiers rely on each other, and their morale to overcome the fear of combat, to survive and to succeed. This concept of comradeship is referred to in NZ and Australian terminology as "mateship." In the Australian Army publication, *Junior Leadership on the Battlefield*, (1994), mateship is deemed one of the most valuable assets today and reflects directly

in the performance of the team (Australian Army 1994, 34). This term mateship plays a large role in the concept of morale, cohesion, and esprit de corps in the Australian and New Zealand Armies and is one of the foundations of the ANZAC tradition. Comradeship is synonymous with group cohesion.

In *Morale: A Study of Men and Courage* by John Baynes (1967), Baynes looks at morale from a World War I viewpoint. Baynes' definition of morale was used in chapter one as part of the basis for the working definition of individual morale. This definition tends to accurately portray the overall flavor of the book, as well as give some insight into the complexity of morale and the detailed nature of Baynes' study.

Baynes' study suggested that the source of morale comes from, among others, a nobility of spirit, a love for the cause and one's country, loyalty, esprit de corps, and unselfishness. He also suggested that bloody-mindedness, a refusal to give way in difficult times, provides another source of morale (1967, 97).

Baynes also contended that morale has not changed that much since World War I. The importance of leadership, of unselfishness, and of the need to tend to the soldier's needs remains as important in 1967 as in 1915. It is just the degree of importance that has changed. In 1915 soldiers needed less sympathy, comfort, interest, and explanation of why they should carry out actions. "Morale is an unchanging quality and that ways of sustaining it are in principle unchanging as well, but that where the change comes in is in the methods of applying these principles" (1967, 107). He suggested that in 1967 leaders need to be aware that the soldier was more educated, that the equipment was more sophisticated, and that as a result they needed to take more trouble in seeing to the needs of their men and their morale. This is equally true today in the NZ Army. The environment has changed, but the role morale plays is still pertinent.

This portion of the literature review has covered a broad range of viewpoints on morale,

its elements or components. It served to show that there are a number of differing points of view of what morale actually is. To further build on the review, it was important to look at those factors that influence morale and how they interrelate.

Factors: Discipline and Leadership

In order to set clear parameters under this topic, discipline requires a clear working definition. Discipline in its collective form is defined in *Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary* (1996) as "Training intended to elicit a specified pattern of behavior or character: Behavior that results from such training: A condition or order based on obedience to authority: A set of methods or rules of conduct" (*Webster's* 1996, 199). Self-discipline is defined as ". . . the correction or regulation of oneself for the sake of improvement" (*Webster's* 1996 615). Within the military environment, discipline is not solely associated with the corrective or punishment aspects, it is the acceptance of its rules and regulations, the need for motivation and self control and the maintenance of an orderly structure and obedience to authority, both collectively and individually.

In *Men against Fire*, Marshall contended that morale breeds good discipline, not the other way around. He did not accept that for a soldier to have good morale he must undertake constant drill and be subjected to constant demanding discipline. Marshall believed that even in 1947, this concept was outdated and that the need to train soldiers to respond as if by habit was no longer the focus. A focus on the self-interest of the soldier and appealing to his judgment and imagination would better achieve and maintain morale with better results in combat being the consequences (Marshall 1947, 159). From another perspective, Ben Shalit suggested that Marshall had changed his views on discipline and morale by 1996. In his book *Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (1988), Shalit suggested that Marshall now held the view that discipline was a means to an end and that its existence possibly served as an index of morale (1988, 138).

Shalit, however, did make a suggestion that does correlate to the views of Marshall. He suggested that the effectiveness of a unit in action is a cause of that unit's cohesion and collective morale and that effectiveness is not a result of it (1988, 144). Marshall had a similar viewpoint; however, it is also possible that effectiveness and success in action will be influenced by the unit's morale and cohesion, a view shared by many other prominent authors and past commanders.

Baynes also spent time discussing the roles of discipline and leadership that can be summarized by saying that they have a significant impact on both individual and collective morale. He believed that morale and discipline are interrelated and that leadership breeds good discipline and, therefore, good morale. He stated that discipline is regarded as the keystone of military efficiency by generals and soldiers alike and that unit quality is the state of its discipline and morale (1967,180).

Ben Shalit (1988) quoted a study done by R. G. Bauer, R. L. Stout, and R. F. Holtz entitled *Developing a Conceptual and Predictive Model of Discipline in the US Army* (1976). In this study Bauer and others concluded that discipline is the outcome of three behavioral domains. First was performance, in particular the assumption that “good discipline was perceived to occur in those units that performed best; and for them, performance depended on morale and leadership” (Shalit 1988, 136). The second was appearance, where morale and leadership would result in the best appearance, while the third domain, conduct, showed that high morale and general satisfaction improved this domain. This showed that morale played a key role in the three perceptions of discipline, that is, those factors that best illustrate a unit's discipline, its performance, appearance, and conduct (Shalit 1988, 136-7). The NZ Army's publication, *NZ Army Ethos and Values* (1995), also talked about the role of discipline in terms of its relationship to morale, specifically self-discipline. “Self-discipline is the foundation on which leadership, motivation, courage, morale and unit discipline is built” (NZ Army 1995, 8).

On the topic of leadership, *Five Star Leadership* by Patrick L. Townsend and Joan E.

Gebhardt stated that morale is considered “the most important leadership indicator because the other indicators are affected by it” (1997, 187). They contended that in the Marine Corps morale, leadership, and discipline are closely related, a theme that is reoccurring throughout this literature review. Morale is the force of a unit and leadership is the means to apply that force with discipline being the means to achieve good sound morale.

Successful handling of men implies the application of the qualities of intelligent leadership. The goal of leadership is the instant, cheerful, and willing obedience and cooperation of subordinates. Thus, true discipline is concerned with the desires, the mental states, of individuals and groups. Mental state falls naturally under the label of morale. Leadership and morale are not synonymous; yet they are as inseparable as the component parts of an electrical circuit. Morale is like the current--powerful electromotive force--and leadership is like the conductor that guides and transmits the force to the motor. Hence the state or quality of morale produced is directly proportional to the quality of the conductor or leader. (Townsend and Gebhardt 1997, 188)

In the article entitled “Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task,” *Military Review* May/June (1999), John Spiszer, a US Army major, put forward the theory that leadership played a large role in a soldier's morale, and thus, morale and leadership contributed to combat motivation. He listed some thirteen factors of morale that he had gleaned from many different sources. Among them were leadership, training, command climate or welfare, cause, ideology, cohesion, information, and manpower policies. He quoted T. R Fehrenbach's work *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* which states that the three critical factors of a professional soldier's morale were training, pride, and discipline (1991, 146). Fehrenbach contends that the leadership responsibility to the soldier was to manage these three factors of morale in order to enhance preparedness. The same could be said for morale and operational effectiveness.

Factors: Communications and Information Dissemination

S. L. A. Marshall believed that communication was also a vital factor that influences morale. He suggested that communication helped to overcome mental isolation in combat and maintain the cohesion of the unit. Through this, the individuals were able to know what was

going on, feel included, and feel that they were playing a vital role and were part of the team.

This all had a large impact on the individual's morale, and also the collective effectiveness of the organization in combat. He summed it up as follows:

It is by virtue of the spoken word rather than by sight or any other medium that men in combat gather greater courage from the knowledge that they are being supported by others. Battle morale comes from unity more than from all else and it will rise or fall in the measure that unity is felt by the ranks. (1947, 138)

Further to this, a portion of *Combat Motivation* by Anthony Kellet (1982) dealt with the importance of information sharing and dissemination and the influence it can have on morale and mental preparedness. He echoed Marshall's views and illustrated his point with examples drawn from history. He cited Viscount Slim's efforts to improve morale in the 14th Army in Burma by disseminating information to all levels on the purpose of the war, the role that the Army plays and importantly, the Army's ability to beat the Japanese and be successful. This was at a time when the morale of the Army was at its lowest and the soldiers doubted their purpose and their ability to win, because they had not received any information to the contrary. "A lack of authoritative information leads inevitably to speculation. . . . Besides encouraging rumors, lack of information can also nurture fears and erroneous beliefs" (Kellet 1982, 226-227). This was a direct result of the soldiers not understanding the battlefield and, in particular, their role or purpose on it. Slim believed that a belief in a cause was the most enduring and profound element of morale (Kellet 1982, 9). This was the situation Slim was attempting to address, while at the same time improving morale, by giving the soldiers information upon which to develop a sense of purpose. Montgomery, in his book *Memoirs* (1960), took the view that in order to ensure a soldier's morale remained high "every single soldier must know, before he goes into battle, how the little battle he is to fight fits into the larger picture and how the success of his fighting will influence the battle as a whole" (1960, 88). Hocking, in *Morale and its Enemies* (1918) had the same view. He stated that morale can be looked at as a state of will or purpose and that knowledge of the thing to

be gained by the purpose is of paramount importance (1918, 151). Knowledge through information dissemination of the purpose of a soldier's cause or involvement has a profound effect on his and his group's morale.

This is very relevant today and Kellet quotes from a book by General B Horrocks called *A Full Life* (1962) to illustrate that “the modern soldier needs to know more about what he is doing, and the reasons for it, than did his predecessors” (as quoted in Kellet 1982, 228). Although these examples relate to a war situation, it can be safely assumed that these situations or influences exist in the peacetime environment also.

Factors: Training

“During the past century, British military authorities have viewed thorough training, rather than fear or coercion, as the basis of good morale and discipline” (Kellet 1982, 79). Kellet goes further to quote a post-World War I committee report which stated that “the production of good morale is the most important object in military training.” (1982, 79). Further to this, Baynes believed that morale has qualities that are inherent and qualities that are learned in training. He suggested inherent morale reflects the manner and conditions in which a soldier is brought up, socially and geographically, and that training will build on this and incorporate its influences into the establishment of group cohesion and morale. The focus of training, according to Baynes, was to turn individual morale into esprit de corps (1967, 101). Lord Moran, as portrayed in *Anatomy of Courage* (1945), also held this view. Training leads to proficiency, which leads to confidence and a willingness to accept military discipline, all of which contribute to morale and esprit de corps (Baynes 1967, 101-103). Baynes, Moran, and Kellet have similar views on the importance and role that training has on morale both individually and collectively.

One further view is offered by C. W. Valentine in *The Human Factor in the Army: Some Applications of Psychology to Training, Selection, Morale and Discipline* (1943). Valentine

believed that training must be efficient and effective or it will degrade morale. Training for training sake can be detrimental to the morale of the soldier and the organization (1943, 71). He went on to suggest that soldiers who receive proficient training conducted in a challenging but effective manner will possess better morale. This will also enhance the morale and fighting ability of the unit that undergoes this training not only based on proficiency, but also on morale and its impacts (Valentine 1943 74).

Factors: Social and Political Influences

An article in *Military Thought* (August 2000) entitled “Morale and the Country's Defense Capability” by M. Y. Zelenkov examined the morale of military servicemen in enhancing the defense capability of a country. He also discussed social and political influences and the impact they can have on a military organizations morale and capability. He contended that “an aggregate of military-political, socio-economic, and military ergonomic factors have a considerable impact on morale” (2000, 76). He further suggested that, in terms of a military organization, the main source of morale stemmed from its place in the socioeconomic policies of the government, its status and public opinion of the military. “The main source of morale for an army at war lies not within itself, but in the society whose interests it is defending” (2000, 76).

Often a nation's mass media will reflect the thoughts of society and can therefore play a role in influencing the morale of a military organization. Zelenkov also wrote an article entitled “Maintenance of Morale in the Military” for *Military Thought* (August 2000). He contended that the mass media, or fourth estate “can boost troop's morale, mobilize them to the performance of their mission, or demoralize them and make them doubt the justice of the cause for which they shed blood” (2000, 54). He also discussed that the image portrayed by the media can have an impact on the view that society has of its military. He believed that Vietnam and Chechnya provide testimony to this assertion.

A very similar view was expressed by Kellet (1982). Kellet contended that public recognition and opinion of the cause for which soldiers fight was often reflected by a nation's media and can have a profound effect on a soldier's morale (1982, 177). Perhaps Montgomery's comment in his book *Morale in Battle: Analysis* (1946) summed it up by saying that a soldier's morale rises immensely when his efforts are applauded and appreciated. He believed that public recognition or propaganda was an important contributor to high morale (1946, 23). In his *Military Review* article of July-August 1999 entitled "Military Retention Intangibles: Esprit, Morale and Cohesion," Congressman Ike Skelton supported this point of view. He stated that among the many factors that influence the morale of a military organization, one of the most significant was the political aspect. He stated that Congress influenced morale through pay, benefits, and other environmental factors such as equipment and capability procurement and appropriations. It also influenced morale by the manner in which it showed its support for the service and the missions that they were undertaking (Skelton 1999, 3). The point of this review was to highlight that external influences impact on the morale of the military organization and that two of the most influential are the political and social perceptions of the military.

Factors: Soldier Welfare

Another element which has links to the psychological aspects of morale is the welfare of the soldier. In terms of welfare and the impact of looking after the soldier's needs, *Defeat into Victory* by Field Marshall William J. Slim (1956) illustrated that this aspect of morale can and does improve the effectiveness and efficiency of a unit or organization. In an attempt to improve the morale of the retreating allied forces in Burma in World War II, Slim identified three foundations of morale: spiritual, intellectual, and material (1956, 182). In spiritual he referred to a belief in the cause, which has already been touched on. By intellectual morale, Slim referred to the instillation in the army of a belief that it can and will win and that it must have confidence in

their leaders and in the organization to which they belong. Success or victory in combat further enhances this. Slim focused much of his efforts pursuing the material needs of his organization. He did this by ensuring that they had the best equipment and weapons available, that their living conditions were the best possible, and that the soldiers felt that their commanders and the army were looking after them. Slim's foundations of morale and the implementation of systems and methods to achieve these foundations transformed the 14th Army morale into a fighting spirit, which enabled the allies to turn defeat into victory in Burma. His focus on the welfare needs enhanced the fact that morale of an organization and its individuals requires careful consideration and management. This was also reflected in the NZ Army's *Army Ethos and Values* pamphlet (1995), which also highlights the role that good soldier welfare played in developing and maintaining the Army's morale.

Slim's experiences in Burma illustrated how a commander's influence on the organization's welfare systems can impact morale, cohesion, and effectiveness. Baynes also offered his point of view in this regard. He stated that rest, mail, good food, proper medical care, efficient equipment, good training, and good welfare services, particularly to help families on the home front, directly contributed to and influenced the collective morale of a unit (Baynes 1967, 101). FM 22-100 (1999) also made mention of the need to take care of the soldiers by giving them the training, equipment and support they need to keep them alive in combat. "In war, soldiers' comfort is important because it affects morale and combat effectiveness" (1999, 3-4).

Montgomery believed that “Nothing weakened a man more than trouble at home” (Montgomery 1946, 22). This highlighted a point of view on the importance of looking after not only the soldier, but also the soldier's family while he is deployed. In an essay, “Living on the Edge: Building Cohesion and a Will to Win” by Robert Madden, published in *Leadership: The Warrior's Art*, edited by Christopher Kolenda (2001), Madden contended that soldiers must know that their families are being looked after and that effective and efficient support programs are in place. He also stated that soldiers like to know that their families are being kept informed through information briefings and newsletters. Madden believed that this has a large impact on a soldier's morale by reducing psychological baggage (2001, 78). FM 22-100 (1999) encompassed this concept under the general title of “Taking Care of Soldiers” and highlighted its impact on morale. Taking care of soldiers “means providing the family support that assures soldiers their families will be taken care of. . . . and ensuring that a support plan is in place” (FM 22-100 1999, 3-4). It goes to show, then, that looking after a soldier's family is also an important aspect of the soldier's morale. While deployed, soldier welfare includes the welfare of his family back home.

Cohesion, Esprit de Corps, and Regimental Spirit

NZ Army Ethos and Values (1995) outlined the NZ Army's view of cohesion, trust, and unity in the modern military environment. “Modern conflict is, by its very nature, generally a group rather than an individual endeavor. Unity, cohesion, trust, morale, and loyalty between group members and their leaders enable the group to form close bonds and to withstand the severe stresses of the modern battlefield” (*NZ Army Ethos and Values* 1995, 8). This showed that the NZ Army considers morale, cohesion and discipline interlinked and integrated; and therefore, morale can be viewed as a vital component of the ethos and values of the NZ Army. Cohesion was introduced in the literature review of the first subordinate question concerning operational effectiveness. It was, however, necessary to briefly look at it in terms of its

relationship to esprit de corps and regimental spirit and how they relate to morale. In his thesis “Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat Leadership and Societal Influences,” W. M. Darryl Henderson (1985) defined cohesion as: “The bonding together of members of an organization or unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit and their mission” (Henderson 1985, 4). He went on to say unit cohesion is borne from small group cohesion and that small group cohesion is built on motivational norms including morale and esprit de corps (Henderson 1985, 4).

Congressman Ike Skelton took it one step further. He believed that “Through esprit, morale and cohesion, a leader builds a combat ready team of professionals who take pride in their work and in their unit and care about one another like a family” (1999, 5). He believed that in its simplest form “esprit, morale, and cohesion lead to greater combat effectiveness” (1999, 3). He also made a comment that in times of war or operational duty, all three are present, but that in peacetime only morale and esprit de corps have been institutionalized. He contended that factors that build cohesion for operational service often conflict with efficient peacetime administration (1999, 6).

Anthony Kellet (1982) defined cohesion as “the feeling of belonging and solidarity . . . the basis of common experiences, interdependence, and shared goals and values.” Kellet also defined esprit de corps as “a feeling of pride, unity of purpose, and adherence to an ideal represented by the unit” (1982, 46). FM 22-100 (1999) stated that high morale results in cohesive teams (FM 22-100, 1999, 3-3). In *Fight of Flight* (1996), Geoffrey Regan stated “Esprit de corps might be difficult to define but that every soldier needs to feel that he belongs to a unit of which he can be proud. This is essential to his morale and ultimately to his value as a soldier” (1996, 260). The regimental system in vogue with the British and most Commonwealth Armies is based on this concept of cohesion and esprit de corps. The British regimental system is based on traditions and it seeks to promote a sense of community among members of a regiment

or battalion and to foster esprit de corps and morale in the unit, a regimental spirit. While Montgomery agreed with the importance of this issue, he felt that it was “not necessarily a basic factor of morale, because in crisis of battle the majority of men will not derive encouragement from the glories of the past but will seek aid from their leaders and comrades of the present” (1946, 21). In *Morale*, Baynes tended to suggest another viewpoint. He believed that regimental spirit was a compelling factor in the example of the 2nd Scottish Rifles in World War 1. He contended that those that served in the 2nd Scottish fought with a determination not to compromise or taint the tradition or spirit of the battalion forged in battles, such as Neuve Chappelle in 1915 (Baynes 1967).

In *Fighting Spirit*, F. M. Richardson dedicated a whole chapter to regimental spirit and its links to cohesion, morale, and esprit de corps. He believed that regimental spirit was part of the broader term, esprit de corps, and that regimental spirit contributed to it. He also believed that “morale is an essential part of esprit de corps,” and that regimental spirit and esprit de corps are vital for the achievement of unit cohesion (Richardson 1978, 20). A similar view was held by Major William A. Knowlton (1983). Knowlton believed that “The other aspect of cohesion important to military units is unit pride or esprit de corps” (Knowlton 1983, 38).

One final viewpoint on the regimental system was offered by Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Phipps, British Army, in his monograph “Unit Cohesion, a Prerequisite for Combat Effectiveness” (1982). Phipps looked at the benefits of the regimental system over the more turbulent American model, where manpower changes are common place. He suggested that the regimental system not only bred a positive spirit but also enhanced combat effectiveness through a less-turbulent and, therefore, less-disruptive personnel system. He believed that personnel turbulence in units and formations decreases morale and cohesion and, therefore, had a detrimental effect on combat effectiveness (Phipps 1982).

Cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit not only contribute to morale, but are, to a certain extent, borne from it also. This further confused the issue of morale and its components, products, or factors. Perhaps Knowlton best summed up morale as a whole with his comment that “One of the things that makes morale such a difficult factor to explain is that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts; morale transcends its components” (1983, 38). Cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit are but a few of these parts or components that Knowlton refers to and as such, may be better classed as products of morale.

Summary

In summary, this portion of the literature review covered both the elements and components of morale and a range of factors of morale and their interrelationship. It was by no means exhaustive; however, the focus was on attempting to review those elements and factors most relevant to the NZ context. It is acknowledged that very little NZ specific literature was included other than doctrine. This was done for two reasons: first, the lack of relevant literature on this subject that was NZ specific, and second, the desire to look at the topic from a viewpoint external to NZ and then relate it back to the NZ context during the analysis process. Along with a close look at the elements or components of morale in general and as reflected in doctrine, the key factors that influence morale that were discussed were: discipline and leadership, communications and information dissemination, training, social and political influences, soldier welfare, and cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit. The presence or application of all of these factors and potential products may well determine whether morale is critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

What Are the Future Circumstances and Changes that May Influence Morale in the Modern NZ Army?

The NZ Army will undergo a period of significant change, potentially, the most significant since the Second World War. A lot of these changes and circumstances will provide challenges that may directly impact on the morale of the NZ Army. The challenges are both technological and human in nature, all in a very high operational tempo environment. This section of the literature review focused on the key changes and challenges: the future battlefield, army modernization, structural reviews and organizational changes, doctrine, budget, pay and human resource (HR) issues, operational tempo and retention, gender integration, and Maori culture integration.

The Future Battlefield

In an age of rapidly developing technological advancements, the battlefield of the future will be very different and will impact on leadership, cohesion, and morale. In “The Will to Fight,” a chapter in a book edited by Sam Sarkesian entitled *Combat Effectiveness*, William Hauser made the following remarks regarding the battlefield of the future:

First, dispersion and high mobility will intensify his relationship with his small crew, section, or squad. At the same time, modern communications and the dependence of high technology material on elaborate support and maintenance will make the soldier acutely aware of his integration into the combined arms and support services. Next the technical and tactical complexity of the battle will make the soldier increasingly reliant on the expertise and leadership of his officers. (1980, 199-200)

Another viewpoint was offered by Robert Madden. He contended that:

The contingency soldier on the battlefield of tomorrow wins or loses the battle based on the level of cohesion developed in peacetime. Confidence in himself, in his weapon, in his comrades, in his leaders, virtually his entire psychological readiness, is a result of the efforts of his leaders and the quality of training he has received in advance. (2001, 79)

For a long time, U.S. Army doctrine has predicted that the battlefield of the future will have an impact on the human dimension. FM 100-5 (1986) stated that units will find themselves

isolated on the future battlefield, which will place increased importance on sound leadership, morale, and cohesive, well-trained units. FM 100-5 (1993) stated that the human dimension of war will be just as decisive in the campaigns and battles of the future as it has been in the past. It is worth noting that the human dimension is not mentioned in any great detail in FM 3-0 (2001).

Finally, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (1994) outlined existing American doctrine of peace operations. It contended that one of the critical considerations in the planning and execution of peace operations was the health and morale of the soldiers carrying out the mission.

Peace Operations often require special consideration of soldiers health, welfare and morale. These operations frequently involve deployments to austere, immature theaters with limited life support systems. In addition, peace operations place unique demands, such as periods of possible boredom while manning observation posts and checkpoints, on soldiers. Soldiers must deal with these stresses while under the constant scrutiny of the world press. (FM 100-23 1994, 37)

This is particularly relevant given the likelihood of the NZ Army's continued and possibly increased level of commitment to PSO in the future, not so much in terms of the nature of future operations, but from the point of view of the morale of the future soldier.

These extracts neatly summarized the possible environment that the NZ Army will face after undergoing the planned changes and given current policy direction. The army is already undergoing the initial steps of this process to ready the force for the battlefield of the future, and as such, the challenges and circumstances that may affect the morale of the army are already starting to impact the soldiers.

Army Modernization

The army's transformation forms part of the NZDF modernization program as outlined in NZ government's *Defense Policy Framework* (Jun 2000) and *A Modern, Sustainable Defense Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs* (May 2001). Along with the *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement* (2001), these documents provide the strategic level direction for the NZDF. The changes specified in these documents not only impact the army but also the other services.

However, in the strategic context of the NZDF, the army's capabilities will be the main focus of the government's force modernization efforts, while navy and air force capabilities will be the likely bill payers (May 2001, 4). In essence, the government's defense policy is to build a modern, professional, and well-equipped defense force with the necessary military capabilities across all three services to meet NZ's objectives. It is being reconfigured, so that it is sustainable and affordable over the long term (May 2001, 2). The major changes that will impact the army, as outlined in the defense policy documents, are as follows:

1. A shift in focus to a more joint approach to structure and organization.
2. Acquisition of new third generation, light-armored vehicles (LAVIII), tactical communications, and light-operational vehicles (LOV)
3. Upgrading of infantry direct fire support weapons, including new antiarmor guided missile systems, AGL, and heavy machine guns
4. The acquisition of modern command and control systems and equipment

Structure Reviews and Organizational Changes.

At the operational level the army is conducting a review of its capabilities and structures in order to meet the changes outlined in the strategic level guidance contained in the government's defense policy documents. *Army 2005: The Objective Deployable Force* (2000) is the concept document that reflects the intended organization of the army if all capital acquisition plans and related restructuring goes ahead. One of the driving forces behind this force structure is the introduction of the LAV III that will see the two current infantry battalions rerole from light to motorized infantry, a fundamental shift in capability, tactics, and procedures (Army 2005 2000, 1). It will also see major structural changes to a number of army units, including combat support and combat service support. These structural changes will see units roled, some disbanded and others picking up new capabilities. The objective deployable force (ODF) is designed to meet

the full range of contingencies, some unilaterally, but most as part of a larger coalition force within a joint scenario. The aim is for the army to be capable of providing a combined arms, fully integrated force package based on a motorized infantry battalion to meet all directed outputs by 2005 (Army 2005 2000, 1). A lot depends on the procurement process and whether funding is made available on time; however, the process itself will see fundamental changes that will present numerous challenges for the army, its leaders, and soldiers, changes which may impact on the morale of the modern NZ Army.

Doctrine

Much of what is driving the changes listed above is capability based; however, doctrine plays a part also. The doctrinal base of the modern NZ Army has influenced a lot of the proposed changes to organizations and structures and has driven the need to replace equipment to meet outputs within the context of the army's land force doctrine. These changes are reflected to some degree in the organizations proposed for the *Army 2005: The Objective Deployable Force* (2000). The doctrinal concepts of maneuver warfare and the command philosophy of directive control were adopted by the NZ Army in 1993. The hallmarks of both maneuver warfare and directive control--mission command--are agility, initiative and trust, all based on sound leadership, training and unit cohesion. (*Army Ethos and Values* 1995, 5-6) To achieve the ODF, these doctrinal concepts will provide the background upon which the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the modern NZ Army will be developed.

Budget, Pay, and Human Resources Issues

The current defense policy sees an increase in spending on the NZDF of \$300 million over the next five years and \$700 million over the next ten years. This is an effort to provide more financial certainty for the force as a whole (May 2001, 12). In line with this, the government authorized the first round of pay increases for up to 80 percent of the armed forces in

May 2001. This was an attempt to “bring remuneration of service personnel more in line with other sectors. . . . It recognizes that the defense force's personnel are its greatest asset” (May 2001, 14-15). It is the government's intentions to put in place mechanisms that will “enable the pay levels to keep pace with changes in wages generally” (May 2001, 15). This strategic level focus for the NZDF will have a significantly impact on the army not only in terms of capabilities, but also in terms of its people. The increase in defense spending, the first for a number of years, will present challenges and changes in capabilities and in the environment that the army must meet in order to provide the government and the people of NZ with a viable land-based defense force.

The recently released *Beyond 2010, NZ Army Human Resource Strategy* (2001) addresses the remuneration issue in outline, along with other initiatives designed to provide direction and guidance out to the year 2010. The strategy develops a way ahead and makes a number of predictions upon which to base Human Resource (HR) management for the Army of 2010. On remuneration, the strategy states that the remuneration system must be flexible, able to recognize and reward merit and performance, and above all be closely linked with the civilian sector (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 14). This is seen as a vital component of the HR environment and a vital tool in ensuring that this resource is managed effectively and with the long-term good of the army in mind. It pays particular attention to its impact on recruitment and retention (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 7-8).

Furthermore, the strategy goes on to reinforce the importance of HR management to, and within the future NZ Army:

A successful human resource (HR) strategy is a key component of the Army Continuous Modernization Plan (ACMP). The ACMP prescribes a 'modernization pathway' for the development of the Army's capabilities to beyond 2010. These capabilities are given effect through force structures, the development of which is based upon doctrinal development, equipment purchases and the availability of sufficient numbers of the right people. Quite obviously, this latter factor represents a key challenge, in that we will not be able to develop the necessary structures unless the number and quality of personnel can be guaranteed. . . . the need to address HR issues in an integrated way, given

structural change we are about to embark on, becomes a priority. (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 4)

The strategy also addresses in some detail, individual development and the direction this will take in the modern army. “Individual development comprises education, training and experiential activities, all of which are to be used to prepare well informed, confident, self disciplined personnel who are equipped to cope with an environment of change in both operations and peacetime” (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 12).

The strategy also addresses other significant issues of HR management, including career management, recruiting, retention, workforce planning, and workplace environment. On career management, “The army's career management system and practice is to acknowledge the partnership between the individual and the organization” (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 13). Together with the other key areas listed, this works together to ensure that the “right people are in the right place at the right time to make a difference” (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 5). The strategy goes a long way to outlining a plan for the future, a plan that reflects elements of the human dimension of the modern NZ Army, and, while not specifically mentioned, it is possible to see morale, both individual and collective, being implied.

Operational Tempo and Retention

The *NZ Army HR Strategy* (2001) predicts a high tempo future environment as well as continuing difficulties in retention and recruiting, particularly technical personnel (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 17-18). The strategy also predicts that environmental factors, such as demographics and technology, will have an impact on the army's ability to attract and retain military age personnel and that the army will continue to experience personnel pressure in meeting its outputs (*NZ Army HR Strategy* 2001, 11-14). In part, the strategy outlines the steps that will need to be taken in order to retain the individuals in the army, and addresses these as improvements or initiatives in the broad areas of career management, workplace environment,

workforce planning, individual development, and remuneration.

In the 2001 *NZ Ministry of Defense Annual Report*, it was reported that the NZDF is committed to thirteen UN or UN sanctioned peace support or humanitarian demining missions around the world. At present, approximately 839 personnel are serving on peace support operations, almost 700 of whom are involved in the East Timor UN mission (Min of Def Report 2001, 8). Of this figure of 839, approximately 760 (17 percent of the Regular Army) are NZ Army personnel. The NZDF is also committed to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and a host of other smaller deployments of small groups and individuals. Along with this are the overseas exercises as part of its defense alliance and treaty commitments that often involve groups of up to 120 personnel. This, coupled with commitments internal to NZ, such as ceremonial activities, support to the civil power and disaster relief, illustrates that the NZ Army has a high level of operational tempo. It is likely that this level of operational tempo will remain as long as the NZ government maintains its focus for the NZDF on PSO (Min of Def Report 2001).

Congressman Ike Skelton summed up the impact of operational tempo on retention in the U.S Army by stating that “the military finds itself busier than ever. . . . which translates to longer and more frequent periods away from home for those fewer personnel remaining. Simply put, a high operational tempo is wearing out the troops, and in the aggregate, they are giving notice with their feet” (Skelton 1999, 3). Skelton also contended that there is little doubt that improved morale and esprit have a positive effect on retention and that troops in cohesive units, infused with esprit and good morale and led by caring leaders, will want to stay in the military. “All the pay and benefits in the world won't stem the tide of experienced non-commissioned officers and junior officers (Captains and Majors) leaving the service if they are poorly led and not taken care of” (1999, 7).

It is worth noting that although Skelton's article was written in the context of the U.S

military, his points accurately reflect the modern NZ Army environment. While it is often stated that retention rates directly reflect the level of morale, it should be made clear here that low morale is not the only reason for poor retention rates and that other factors contribute to the decision soldiers and officers make to leave the service. In this case, however, this thesis has focused on the morale aspects and its impacts on retention.

Gender Integration

Defense Force Order (Army), Volume 1, the CGS's vision for the NZ Army of 2015 and beyond, states in draft that the NZ Army of the future could include a higher proportion of woman, possibly up to 50 percent (*DFO (A)* Vol 1 2000, ii). The NZ Army as part of the defense force is striving to embody employment equity and in the army. As stated in the *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement*, this means integrating women into the full range of employment options, including combat units. It is not a question of whether integration of women into combats should take place, but when and how it will take place. This is reflected in the CGS Directive 39/00 "Equal Opportunity Employment and the Integration of Women into Combat Trades" (2000) which establishes the policy and procedures for the integration of women into the combat trades.

In *New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale* (1997), Margaret C. Harrel and Laura L. Miller contend that gender integration has relatively little effect on unit cohesion and morale. The only exceptions were the impact on morale of sexual harassment and perceived double standards (Harrell and Miller 1997, 99-100). On the other hand, Major A. I. Alderman's monograph entitled "Women in Direct Combat: What is the Price of Equality" (1993) concluded that allowing women to undertake roles in direct combat units would and could reduce the unit's cohesion and, therefore, combat effectiveness. Many sources agreed with this conclusion that the presence of women in a male-dominated domain will adversely affect morale and cohesion and possibly, as a result, combat effectiveness

Major John Rogers in his thesis “Gender Integration in the NZ Infantry” (2001) addressed this topic in detail. The focus of his paper was to attempt to determine how best to integrate women into the combat units while maintaining or improving the force's operational effectiveness. As part of this study, Rogers addressed the issue of integration and its impact on cohesion and morale. While his research tended to support a conclusion that, apart from aspects, such as sexual harassment and perceived double standards, unit cohesion and morale are not likely to be degraded to any great degree by gender integration and that to assume that the opposite is true is to be shortsighted. He did, however, make the point that to ensure that this remained the case in the NZ Army example, strong leadership is required at all levels to build strong cohesive units regardless of gender makeup (Rogers 2001, 59-60). By doing this we undermine the ability of this issue to degrade cohesion and morale as gender integration of women into the combat trades is undertaken in the modern NZ Army.

Maori Culture Integration

In 1995, the NZ Army became a tribe; Ngati Tumatauenga, or the “Tribe of the War God.”

The Army is a family bound together by the Service ethic, traditions and common values and on our cultural and national heritage. To this end, the Army has adopted its own distinct cultural identity and taken the name Ngati Tumatauenga--all members of the Army, military and civilian employees and their families belong automatically. (NZ Army accessed Dec 2001, [ww.army.mil.nz/nzarmy/grids/b_grids.asp?id=133&area=16](http://www.army.mil.nz/nzarmy/grids/b_grids.asp?id=133&area=16))

This initiative was aimed at embracing and integrating both the Maori culture and its warrior spirit within the army, with the impact being at the collective level, the enhancement of the cohesion and esprit de corps of the force. The NZ Army has a proud Maori tradition and history, including the famous 28th Maori Battalion in World War 2, and has actively been promoting this tradition and its integration for some time (*Army Ethos and Values* 1995). The cultural integration has so far included the establishment of a marae, or meeting house, which has

given the tribe its home. It has also included the adoption of its own haka (war dance) in order to develop the warrior spirit, and linked the British traditions that have been a part of the army's environment for such a long time with native NZ culture. This initiative is unique to the NZ Army and is likely to become a more significant part of the army's culture in the future and will, therefore, continue to have an impact on the morale and effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

Summary

This portion of the literature review focused on those areas of change that may present challenges to morale of the modern NZ Army. This was the basis of the environment that the NZ Army will have to adapt to and upon which the analysis of the material research will be applied in chapter four. The army is undergoing, and will undergo the biggest single capability enhancement since the World War 2 some fifty-six years ago (Army 2005 2000, 1), and it is necessary to balance this with the human dimension, a dimension that reflects the Army's greatest asset: its manpower.

Summary

The literature review was developed in accordance with the three subordinate questions in order to set up the methodology for subsequent analysis. First, it addressed the literature that pertains to operational effectiveness as it relates to the subject of morale. The review then looked at the many elements or components of morale and the factors that influence morale in an effort to get an overview in some depth. This portion of the review focused on those areas that directly reflect the NZ Army environment and were within the confines of this study. It does show, however, that morale is a very complex subject, not easily compartmentalized. Finally, the review looked at an overview of those challenges that the modern NZ Army environment may present to the organization's morale. The data presented in this chapter formed the basis of the analysis methodology that was conducted in chapter 4. A thorough knowledge of all literature

pertaining to the three subordinate questions is necessary in order to commence the analysis of the primary thesis question: Is morale critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army?

CHAPTER 3


RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The dominant feeling on the battlefield is loneliness gentlemen, and morale, only morale as a foundation under training and discipline, will bring victory. (1956, 217)

Field Marshal Viscount William Slim
Defeat into Victory

This chapter outlined the methodology that was used in chapter 4 to analyze the data gathered during the research, and reflected and documented in chapter 2. The process used to gather the data was based on the subordinate questions. The analysis methodology also followed this process to adequately address the primary question: Is morale critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army?

The analysis in chapter 4 was reflective of the NZ context *now*, including, military ethos, political and social aspects, the Army's current context, environment, and other relevant factors. This context was based on the author's views of these factors as they applied to the research material gathered. This provided the research material its NZ flavor and was done cognizant of the implications and impacts of the modern NZ Army environment, including its challenges and changes. To support this analysis, the author developed a morale model to analyze the data. This model is discussed later in this chapter. Figure 1 summarized the overall analysis process that was used. The data gathered in chapter 2 were analyzed in chapter 4 by subordinate questions within a NZ context. NZ context referred to the application of the data gathered to the current and future NZ Army in order to identify similarities and dissimilarities. The collective result of this analysis was then applied to the morale model, again within the current and future Army environment, in order to answer the primary thesis question.



What is Operational Effectiveness in Terms of a Modern NZ Army?

The focus of analysis was on determining a definition of operational effectiveness within the NZ context against which to test the importance of morale for the modern NZ Army. Given the subjective nature of what actually characterizes operational effectiveness, it proved difficult to develop a quantitative model. This was especially pertinent given the human dimension of the topic. Although quantitative tools exist, such as OPRES and the U.S Army unit readiness system, they do not adequately address the human dimension and therefore are of limited value. The focus of the analysis determined certain characteristics that could be indicative of the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness, characteristics that incorporate the human dimension and are largely qualitative in nature. These are largely based on the doctrinal aspects of combat, or fighting power, and the principles and tenets of operations. Other elements include, cohesion, effective leadership at all levels, the ability to effectively manage change, and the ability to

integrate the physical, such as organizational and equipment factors, with the human aspects of a military organization. These characteristics helped to formulate a definition of the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness criteria.

What Are the Key Elements or Components of Morale,
the Factors that Influence Morale, and
How Do They All Interrelate?

Under this subordinate question, the analysis focused on the elements or components of morale, the factors that influence morale, and how they interrelate. First, the definition of morale in terms of the modern NZ Army was determined, then the elements or components of morale were analyzed in the NZ context. This analysis was based on the data captured in the *Doctrinal View of Morale* and *Moral: A Closer Look* portions of chapter 2 as well as the key definitions outlined in chapter 1. This analysis provided the basis upon which to apply the factors that influence morale and the potential products of it. The analysis of the factors and products of morale first required the establishment of distinct areas so that the NZ context could be effectively applied. These areas were grouped under the headings of discipline and leadership, communications and information dissemination, training, social and political influences, soldier welfare, and cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit. The NZ context was then applied to each specific area and, where possible, included references and examples from the author's operational experiences in East Timor as an element of the NZBATT2, UNTAET in 2000.

The analysis of this subordinate question focused on determining what role these factors played in terms of the morale of the Army within the NZ context. It also looked at their interrelationship and the possible products or effects, such as cohesion and esprit de corps, that may be produced through morale in the Army.

What Are the Circumstances and Changes
That May Influence Morale in the Modern NZ Army?

This portion of the analysis focused on discussing the various challenges and changes that face the modern NZ Army, with particular emphasis placed on the impact they will have on individual and collective morale of the force. The eight key challenges were: the future battlefield; army modernization; structural reviews and organizational changes; doctrine; budget; pay and HR issues; operational tempo and retention; gender integration; and Maori culture integration.

Each of these changes and challenges was analyzed in terms of the role it plays in the modern NZ Army environment, the impact it will, or may have, on the morale of its soldiers and on the organization as a whole, and how morale may influence its implementation. Linking the data gathered and determining the potential impacts on the Army's morale were key to the analysis for this subordinate question. It was also key to the establishment of the modern NZ Army environment and a basis upon which to build the analysis of the primary question.

Is Morale Critical to the Operational Effectiveness of the Modern NZ Army?

The collective analysis of the independent analysis conducted under the three subordinate questions in order to answer the primary thesis question was the final step in the research methodology. A NZ Army Morale Model, as depicted in figure 2, was developed to achieve this analysis and to capture and summarize the conclusions made under the subordinate questions.

This model brought all the individual elements together and analyzed their interrelationship within the modern NZ Army environment. The term *Morale* in the center of the diagram reflected the elements and components of morale, those elements that help to define what morale actually is. *discipline, leadership, welfare, communications and information, training, and social and political influences* were the factors that influence morale. *Cohesion and esprit de corps* were potential products that result from morale.




Figure 2: New Zealand Army Morale Model

listed figure 2. This model reflected the key areas that formed the research framework for chapter 2 and the analysis that was subsequently conducted. Essentially, the key factors of discipline, leadership, welfare, communications and information, training, and social and political influences internal to the NZ Army system are linked together and to morale. This portion of the model showed the links they have to each other and to morale.

The model then analyzed the link morale had to cohesion and esprit de corps and then the impact this link has on operational effectiveness. The potential impact of operational effectiveness in the form of operational success on the model was also analyzed. The analysis process was then applied to the modern NZ Army environment. To do this, the analysis was conducted by looking at the impact of the eight challenges and changes on each of the key factors that influence the overall morale of the NZ Army, specifically on morale and its collective components. This analysis also included the impact of the environment on the model as a whole. This analysis ultimately leads to the conclusions and recommendations contained in chapter 5. These conclusions and recommendations reflect the impact morale may have on the effectiveness of the modern NZ Army to determine its importance, and, more significantly, they reflect why.

Summary

The methodology for this thesis applied the NZ context to the information gathered by subordinate question, with the NZ context being the identification of similarities and dissimilarities to the data gathered, and the application of the information to the current and future NZ Army environment. The intent for the first subordinate question analysis is to produce a definition for “operational effectiveness” for the modern NZ Army, while the focus for the second subordinate question was to determine the impact and inter-relationships of several key elements, factors and potential products of morale. Finally, the third subordinate question looks at the impact that the challenges and changes that characterize the modern NZ Army environment may have on the morale of the force.

The deductions and conclusions which fell out of the analysis of the subordinate questions were then grouped together and collectively tested against the modern NZ Army morale

model which brought it all together for analysis in order to address the primary question. The deductions are taken forward as conclusions into chapter 5, and from these relevant recommendations are drawn for further study and research. The focus of the analysis was to answer whether morale is critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army and to determine why is it so?

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The art of war is subjected to many modifications by industrial and scientific progress. However, one thing does not change, the heart of the man. In the last analysis, success in battle is a matter of morale. (1880, 84)

Colonel Charles-Ardant du Picq
Battle Studies

The above quote by the famous French military theorist Charles-Ardant du Picq sums up the situation that faces the modern NZ Army and mirrors the essence of this thesis. Given the pending modifications, challenges, and changes facing the NZ Army, *is* morale a critical factor for success in battle or on operations for the NZ Army of the future, where success in modern terms equals operational effectiveness? In this chapter, the data gathered and reflected in chapter 2 have been analyzed in accordance with the methodology as laid out in chapter 3. The analysis was conducted by answering the subordinate questions, with the key to the analysis being the collective application of the data to the NZ context and the future environment.

The analysis conducted on the individual subordinate questions explored two main aspects: first, the degree of crossover or interrelationship that existed between the elements, factors, and products of morale; and second, to what degree did morale play a central role in determining the efficiency of the modern NZ Army and ultimately set the conditions for operational success or effectiveness. The end result was to determine whether du Picq was right in noting that morale is critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army, and, if so why?

What is Operational Effectiveness in Terms of a Modern NZ Army?

Strategic Direction and Operational Effectiveness

The analysis of this aspect of operational effectiveness focused on the directed strategic requirements and how they applied to the definition of operational effectiveness. The strategic direction did not necessarily focus on the detailed level, such as the ability to employ new equipment and the ability to apply new technology. The analysis focused purely on the strategic aspect of the definition of operational effectiveness in terms of the modern NZ Army.

The *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement* clearly outlined the government's directed outputs that the NZ Army, as part of the NZ Defense Force, must be able to provide or be capable of undertaking. It also stated that, to be viable, the NZ Army must maintain experience and achieve the required training standards to meet the outputs. This strategic level direction, therefore, provided the basis upon which the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness can be applied, and the basis upon which it can be tested. In this context alone, simply put, the NZ Army must be capable of successfully undertaking the stated roles and missions and provide the stated capability for it to be operationally capable and effective. Both quantifiably and qualitatively, in order for the NZ Army to be classed as operationally effective, it must be capable of operating across the spectrum of operations: humanitarian to war fighting, and meet the requisite and associated training standards and experience levels necessary for each type of operation. As specified in the *2001/2002 Purchase Agreement*, to do this the Army needs to be well led with experienced, trained leaders at all levels and needs to possess the ability and wherewithal to effectively train and prepare its soldiers for a wide variety of employment possibilities. This is a vital step necessary to ensure that the modern NZ Army can achieve its strategic direction through operational effectiveness and by being operationally capable. It is also the first element that helps define operational effectiveness in terms of the modern NZ Army.

Operational Effectiveness and Doctrine

The primary NZ Army operational doctrine publications, LWD 1 and FM 3-0, provide the basis upon which the NZ Army operates and trains. As outlined in chapter 2, both documents used principles and tenets upon which this doctrine is based. They also outline the elements that make up combat or fighting power, those aspects that define what an Army needs to possess in order to be a credible combat and fighting force. To do this, the modern NZ Army must be capable of generating and maintaining combat power within its resource limits. It is, therefore, safe to say that the Army must be able to employ or apply the principles and tenets of land force operations as reflected in the Army's doctrine. This, therefore, theorizes that the effective application of the various components of combat power (FM 3-0) and fighting power (LWD-1), together with the principles and tenets of operations, will lead to operational effectiveness across the full range of military operations. The result of this is mission success, which in its most basic form, quantifies operational effectiveness. Given morale's stand-alone status in LWD-1's elements of fighting power, it therefore can also be said that the modern NZ Army's morale plays an important role in the application of the principles of war and the generation of combat power, and, therefore, operational effectiveness. This gains more relevance given that leadership (morale) is considered the essential and dynamic component of combat power (FM 3-0). If this is accepted, then the Army's morale is one of the *essential and dynamic* components of its operational effectiveness.

Effective Military Change Management

Given the doctrinal analysis above, together with the changes that the army faces, it will need to manage the change in order to ensure operational effectiveness, especially if the Army is to remain capable of meeting its outputs. Change can be disruptive and disheartening and can, in

turn lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness if it is not managed effectively (Townsend and Gerbhardt, 2001). They also state that military change management requires sound leadership where all levels of the system are involved in the process. This includes ensuring that those who will implement the change, will be responsible for the effective and efficient integration of new technology, and for the necessary restructures will be fully included in the planning and implementation process. The modern NZ Army needs to be aware of this as it attempts to manage the pending changes to its organization and structure. The operational effectiveness of the Army will need to be preserved throughout the process, and this involves being aware of the impact of the changes on the people of the service. This thesis did not go into the detail of how to effectively manage change, but simply points out that the Army must ensure that, however it goes about implementing change, operational effectiveness is still maintained, and the human dimension is considered throughout the process. How the Army and its people come out of the period of change will no doubt determine its operational effectiveness and to what degree the newly implemented technology will enhance this effectiveness. It can, therefore, be said that the ability to effectively manage and implement change can be considered as a vital component of operational effectiveness, especially given the context of the modern NZ Army.

Measuring Operational Effectiveness

Operational effectiveness is very difficult to measure other than on the battlefield where effectiveness is sometimes quantified in lives. It is difficult because in peacetime it is hard to identify the necessary components required to form the foundation of effectiveness, and it is not very easy to quantify some of these components in measurable terms. To a certain degree, the NZ Army has attempted to quantify aspects of the system in an effort to determine, in effect, preparedness for operations. Readiness assessment does, to some degree, provide a quantifiable method of assessing effectiveness, but it is by no means the be all and end all. Readiness is just

one part of this equation, and it does not necessarily translate to effectiveness while on operational tours of duty.

As stated in chapter 2, the NZ Army's capability and readiness assessment system is the NZ Army Operational Preparedness Reporting System (OPRES). It provides for the evaluation and reporting of the operational preparedness of NZDF elements to their DLOC in peacetime and OLOC in preparation and while conducting operations. These DLOC and OLOC requirements exist for each contingency based on the strategic direction of outputs and ECs. Evaluation and assessments of these requirements at unit level are mostly carried out during exercises, competitions, routine tests of achievements and proficiency, and operational, technical, and administrative inspections. These tests, based on an assessment against key performance indicators, are designed to produce a report on the unit's preparedness, its capabilities, and deficiencies. They do not, however, take into account the human dimension.

OPRES does go some way to quantifying the elements of combat power and their application by the elements of the NZ Army, but it is based on capability and not real application. Effectiveness of application may well only really be achieved in live firing exercises or under battle conditions. OPRES also reports on the manning state of the unit and this reflects its actual manning against its established and authorized manning levels. It does this by overall numbers and by critical appointment, such as company commander. This is the only aspect of the OPRES systems that measures anything of the human dimension of the army system. It does not reflect, for example, the unit's cohesion, its quality of leadership, or its overall morale. It is acknowledged that these aspects are very difficult to quantify, but they are able to be measured in a qualitative fashion. It is a commander's responsibility to assess the human dimension of his units.

The argument here is that the current OPRES system does not accurately assess a unit's

total readiness, preparedness, and, therefore, effectiveness because it does not reflect the human dimension of the Army organization. As outlined in chapter 2, Beaumont and Snyder argue that military effectiveness relies on the effective integration of equipment, doctrine, and people, and that there is also a need to integrate technology effectively. This is particularly relevant to the modern NZ Army and reflects the potential need to integrate the human aspect, with the leadership involving the personnel of the Army and giving them ownership of their part of the system. People play a vital part in the integrated military environment and, therefore, play a vital role in determining its effectiveness. This suggests that the measurement of operational effectiveness needs to reflect the human aspects of the system. Sorley reinforces this point with his views based on the US AURS. Sorley believes that the AURS does not accurately reflect the entire system because it does not take into account such things as leadership, cohesion, motivation, commitment, trained performance, and potential disintegrating factors. In terms of the NZ Army and OPRES, this point is also valid. The OPRES system should be reviewed in order to take into account a vital component of the military system, the human component. To do this would give a more accurate, quantifiable, and qualitative evaluation of a unit's operational effectiveness. It is more than an issue of readiness, it is whether the unit has the morale, motivation, cohesion, and leadership to achieve mission success (operational effectiveness) and overcome potential disintegrating factors, such as poor discipline, drugs and alcohol abuse, and sexual harassment. Without incorporating the human factor in measuring operational effectiveness, the net result of any evaluation is that it is incomplete and potentially misleading. After all, the Army relies heavily on the human dimension and its most valuable asset is its soldiers.

Summary

There are many views on what is military, operational, or combat effectiveness. In essence, they all reflect the overall ability of an organization to effectively integrate and manage various elements of its resources and environment in order to maintain control and to achieve tasks, goals, or missions it has been set. This portion of the analysis attempted to determine a definition of operational effectiveness for the modern NZ Army. In essence, this definition is that, for the Army to be operationally effective, it must be capable of achieving all stated outputs and ECs both in preparation in peace and in execution while on operations. The analysis has identified a number of elements that go some way to characterizing operational effectiveness in the modern NZ Army environment. First, the Army must be well led with experienced, trained leaders at all levels and must possess the ability and wherewithal to effectively train and prepare its soldiers for a wide variety of employment possibilities within its strategic direction. Second, the Army must apply the principles and tenets of war as outlined in doctrine and generate combat and fighting power to ensure it maintains the ability to conduct effective operations and achieve mission success. Third, given the period of change that the Army faces, for it to remain capable of achieving its stated outputs the Army must implement this change while maintaining its operational effectiveness, and the human dimension of the force must be considered as a vital part of the whole process.

One aspect that requires further research is the OPRES process. This system needs to better reflect the human aspects of the Army's preparedness and readiness as they play a vital role in determining the effectiveness and efficiency of a military unit. The factors of morale, leadership and cohesion and other human dimensions are difficult to quantify but can be evaluated qualitatively and are a vital component of any unit or force's ability to meet the three elements outlined above. The measurement system used to evaluate the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness should also reflect that operational effectiveness involves the integration

of all elements of the military system, including its people.

What Are the Key Elements or Components of Morale,
the Factors that Influence Morale, and
How Do They All Interrelate?

Morale and its Components Defined in the NZ Context

In chapter 1, a working definition of individual morale was outlined as a quality of mind involving courage, determination, and endurance in the face of hardship. In the collective sense, it is “the mental fitness and motivation of the group and its individuals” (Cronin 1988, 294). Both of these complement each other and they should both be applied to task and tasks the NZ Army maybe called upon to perform, as these reflect the modern environment.

In the NZ context, individual morale pertains to the quality of mind of soldiers of the modern Army and their ability to face the hardships associated with meeting outputs, including training and preparation for operations in peacetime, and while conducting real-time operational deployments. This individual aspect of the modern NZ soldier contributes to the collective mental fitness and motivation of the group as a whole and, therefore, will be a vital building block of the morale of the modern NZ Army. Morale in the NZ context, therefore, involves *both* the individual and collective aspects and should be viewed as such when considered in terms of the modern NZ Army environment. In its most basic form, the modern NZ Army's morale can be summarized as its *collective state of mind and motivation to achieve set tasks or outputs*.

Also outlined in chapter 1 was the concept that poor morale is the absence of morale. In the NZ context, this can be described as the modern NZ Army *not* possessing the collective state of mind and motivation to achieve set tasks or outputs. The existence of collective morale without individual morale and visa versa would be difficult to prove. This, therefore, suggests that morale either existed in *both* forms or it does not exist at all. This does not suggest that there are not various degrees and levels of morale, but this thesis focused on its existence and the

impact it has.

The conclusions above were further reinforced by the research reflected in chapter 2, specifically under the heading “Morale and its Components: A Closer Look”. In the individual sense, these components included courage, devotion to duty, pride, self-confidence, satisfaction, motivation, and unselfishness. Comradeship (mateship in the ANZAC sense), loyalty, mutual respect, moral support to each other, and the nobility and belief in the cause for which a soldier serves and fights reflect the collective components of morale. Direct correlations of these components to the state of mind and motivation aspects of the individual and collective definitions were also easily drawn. Each of the listed components, whether individual or collective, contribute to “state of mind and motivation.” Other elements discussed were discipline and leadership, which were analyzed as factors influencing morale, and cohesion and esprit de corps, which were viewed as possible products of morale. They were, however, still considered as relevant components as well. This built on the theory that many of the aspects discussed were interrelated with some contributing to morale and others being potential products of morale. This interrelationship formed the basis of the collective analysis of morale's role in relation to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army later in the thesis.

Finally, as outlined by Baynes, the increased level of education of the modern NZ Army soldier means that the soldier understands and is generally more worldly-wise, and, therefore, may question his purpose. This, together with equipment being more sophisticated and potentially more lethal, mandated that leaders take more interest in seeing to the needs of their men to ensure that the modern NZ Army remains efficient and effective, now and in the future. This tends to support the theory that morale is more important now than when Baynes made his comments.

Factors that Influence Morale and Possible Products

In terms of the NZ context, the nine doctrinal points outlined in *Leadership Theory and Practice* (1993) best defined the doctrinal factors that influence morale and provided the basis for the analysis of these factors and their impact on morale. The factors were leadership: unity of purpose; discipline; a sense of belonging and self respect; comradeship; mateship or cohesion; mutual confidence through training; dependent well-being; spiritual beliefs and needs; and comfort and welfare. A brief comparison of these areas to the components already discussed illustrated the 'crossover' of components and elements with factors that influence and potential products (cohesion, esprit de corps) of morale. This illustrated the complex nature of morale and formed an important part of this thesis. For example, comradeship is seen as a component and a factor, and a sense of belonging as a factor equates to the component of moral support to each other. On the other hand, cohesion can be classed equally as a factor, component or more likely as a product. This crossover, or interrelationship, is one of the key foundations of the collective analysis of the primary question undertaken later in this thesis. This does however tend to suggest that components or elements of morale are not only parts of the whole, but may well influence or be products of the same whole.

To facilitate the research and analysis of the factors, those listed in *Leadership Theory and Practice* (1993) have been further refined into leadership and discipline, communications and information dissemination, training, social and political influences, soldier welfare, cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit. These areas are simplified, however, they still reflect the nine listed in Australian Army Leadership Doctrine.

Factor: Discipline and Leadership

In the NZ context and environment, discipline and leadership play a vital role in the Army system and this is not disputed. They are closely linked and have a bilateral influence. Marshall (1967) reflects the general trend of the research that good leadership breeds good

discipline and that good discipline enhances leadership within an organization. This trend is valid to the modern NZ Army. A well-led modern NZ Army will most likely possess and maintain good discipline, while it is equally likely that a disciplined force will be easily led in times of hardship. Self-discipline also enhances collective organizational discipline in much the same way that individual morale enhances collective group morale.

Less clear was whether morale breeds discipline or discipline breeds morale, however, the general trend of the research stated that both are reliant on each other. To paraphrase the words of Townsend and Gerbhardt, morale is the force of a unit, leadership is the means to apply the force, and discipline is the means to achieve sound morale (Townsend and Gerbhardt 1997, 188). Without one, the other is adversely affected. This again suggested a bilateral influence between morale and discipline and, by association, leadership, again this fit the NZ context. However, as analyzed the modern NZ Army must be well led and disciplined, and possess high morale. Because of the close linkage between morale and the factors of leadership and discipline, if one were missing, the modern NZ Army would likely to experience difficulties in meeting the challenges and changes ahead. Leadership and discipline are definitely a foundation upon which the modern NZ Army is built and they interact with many of the other factors, as will become evident during later analysis. Morale may well be the glue that holds it all together.

Factor: Communications and Information Dissemination

The key facet of this area is the flow of information in a military organization, both in peace and in war, now and in the future. Horrocks (1962) stated that modern soldiers need more information than did their predecessors, however, there is a common annoyance in the army of not being told anything and that, when told, the information is false, too late, or inaccurate. This is the case in most large military organizations and the NZ Army is no exception. It is, therefore, more than the use of communications equipment; it is the dissemination of information through

an organization to ensure that the organization's collective purpose, role, and intent is clear to all its members. This communication is a two-way flow, up and down. Soldiers need to be made fully aware of their individual role and purpose so that they gain a sense of belonging, are given faith in the cause, and may feel they are important members of the organization. They also must feel that they can communicate upwards and that their views and comments will be listened to. This was evident in the author's deployment to East Timor as a company commander in NZBATT2, UNTAET, undertaken by elements of the NZ Army in 2000. It is the author's viewpoint that this deployment showed that through effective communications and information dissemination, the soldiers had belief in the cause for which they were deployed and had a sound understanding of the purpose and the role they were undertaking. They could also comfortably provide advice and guidance in the knowledge that this was going to be given due cognizance. This went a long way to achieving sound morale of the soldiers and the organization and was reinforced in the *NZBATT2, UNTAET May to November 2000 End of Tour Report*, 2000, where information dissemination was noted as one of the keys to the success of the deployment. This reinforces that top down and bottom up information dissemination through effective communication within the modern NZ Army is going to be a vital factor that will influence the collective morale of the force.

Marshall pointed out that it was the spoken word that gave the soldier the feeling that he was supported (1947, 138). This and the other material researched are just as relevant today as when they were written. In the modern NZ Army context, preparing the organization for change through information dissemination will help to ensure that the implementation process is effective and efficient and that the individual soldiers feel part of the collective process. This is important no matter how small a role he may play, for he must feel that he is an important member of the larger organization. This is really only achieved if he is regularly told by his superiors and is kept honestly informed. This not only helps morale, both individually and collectively, but also helps

ensure the overall operational effectiveness of the force.

Factors: Training

Training is primarily designed to ensure that a force is effective and capable of carrying out its roles and tasks and prepared to meet the associated demands--proficient. As highlighted by the research, there is a second aspect to the training factor, that is, the morale factor. In the NZ context, the NZ soldier needs to feel confident in his own abilities and those of his peers, commanders and those who support him. Likewise, commanders and leaders need to have confidence and trust in their subordinates and their level of proficiency. This can be achieved through effective, demanding, and challenging training. This training not only builds confidence, but also trust. These are important components of a military organization, especially in terms of leadership. Confidence and trust can, in turn, manifest itself as, among other things, morale and esprit de corps, as well as operational effectiveness. This again was a key factor in the success of NZBATT 2's recent East Timor deployment. In the author's opinion, the level of training undertaken and the standards achieved directly contributed to not only a high level of proficiency, but also a significant level of confidence in the NZ soldier and trust in the leadership at all levels. This in turn contributed to a high degree of morale and cohesion in the units deployed. Again, this is stated as being a contributing factor in the success of the NZBATT 2 deployment in the end of tour report (*NZBATT2, UNTAET May to November 2000 End of Tour Report*, 2000).

It is likely that the modern NZ Army context will require challenging and demanding training to ensure that it can proficiently meet the demands that it will face, and that its soldiers are confident and trust those around and above them. The training needs to be effective and efficient and needs to build on skills, cohesion, and esprit de corps both in the unit and in the wider army. It must also be individual and collective. As stated by Valentine (1943), training for training's sake can be counterproductive and may do more to degrade morale and operational

effectiveness than improve it. The post World War 1 committee quote that training is aimed at producing good morale (Kellet 1982, 79) may be a little dated now, and may not be the most important object of military training, but it does reflect the importance that training has in terms of morale. Training will enhance operational proficiency and, through this, the army's morale. The morale of the modern NZ Army cannot necessarily be trained, but it can be trained *for*.

Factors: Social and Political Influences

The essence of this area was the influence that the political and social opinions of the Army could have on the organization as a whole. In the NZ context, as a norm, defense is not a major electoral issue and does not gain much political attention, or media coverage. The influences of the political and social environment outlined in the research are just as pertinent to the modern NZ Army, however, and in some cases even more so, given the army's small size. In terms of the NZ context, the government and public can have a major influence on the morale of the modern NZ Army.

In the author's opinion and based on seventeen years of service, a lack of political attention and a perceived apathetic attitude of NZ society towards the NZ Army has seen the army take a low place in the issues of the nation. This, in turn, led to a perception of a low level of worth when it came to the army's role in society. Possible examples of this reflected in printed and television media were the repeated cuts in defense spending, a lack of pay increases, a lack of procurement of new technology to replace old equipment, and society's lack of understanding of the role and achievements of the NZ Army. Many in the public arena may also see the NZ Army as an unnecessary burden on the NZ economy. It is not difficult to correlate the impact that this has and will have on morale. It seems that it is only when the NZ Army undertakes high profile, humanitarian deployments or tasks that this attitude change, however, many of the above examples still exist.

It is the author's observation that when the media focus a degree of attention on the cause and purpose of the NZ Army and its deployments, the soldiers feel that they are appreciated and are a vital part of NZ society. The public enters the debate over pay and equipment issues and becomes more knowledgeable on the purpose and undertakings of the NZ Army. It is therefore likely that, based on the research, the morale of the force is enhanced and the soldier's purpose is reinforced. The East Timor example again reinforced this. It appears that the NZ Army's profile has improved somewhat with the high profile East Timor deployments and the political debate surrounding the defense procurement and budgetary processes, and, as such, it appears that the NZ Army has received more than the usual political and media attention. Unfortunately, not all of it is welcome attention. Negative media and political attention can possibly overshadow the achievements of the army and, therefore, have a negative influence on the morale of those performing their duty by having it go unnoticed. Conversely, however, positive attention was a contributing factor to the success of recent East Timor deployments. The level and type of attention that the army receives in the future will undoubtedly shape its morale and the NZ Army's socio-economic relationship with the political and social aspects of NZ society will play a role in determining the morale of the modern NZ Army. The NZ Army needs to be aware of this and manage it carefully to ensure that the political and social profile and relative worth of the army remains high and that through this the soldiers can feel supported, needed, and understood.

Factors: Soldier Welfare

Soldier welfare includes the welfare of the soldier himself, his team, and his family. It is a generic term with broad consequences. It is more than simply feeding and clothing a soldier, it is ensuring that his affairs are looked after, that he has confidence in the welfare system to look after his needs, and that his dependents and family are going to be informed, and where possible, cared for. This can be looked at as his "welfare environment." A happy home is a happy soldier

is a common NZ Army term and it is very relevant. Both Slim and Montgomery highlighted the importance of welfare and its link to morale and combat effectiveness. Very little has changed since then and in fact more demand is placed on the army's welfare system by an increasingly complex society. The soldier and his welfare environment are vital to ensuring high morale and effectiveness.

In the recent deployments to East Timor, elements of the NZ Army made a real attempt to focus attention on the welfare of the deployed soldier and his family and dependents. Support networks were established to keep the families and dependents informed and part of the deployment. Efforts were made to allow soldiers the opportunity to communicate with loved ones and friends and for them to receive comforts from home. This had a beneficial and visible impact on the morale of the deployed units. Also noticeable was impact that occurred when the welfare system broke down such as lengthy delays in receiving mail from home (*NZBATT2, UNTAET May to November 2000 End of Tour Report*, 2000). It is likely that a soldier will be in a better frame of mind while undertaking his duty when he knows that if things go astray at home, his family and dependents will be taken care of and that his immediate welfare needs are being tended to. This is likely to be the same if a soldier is injured and he knows that there is a robust and reliable medical system to look after him. After all a soldier is first a human being with emotions.

Welfare of the modern NZ Army and its wider family is going to be a vital component in determining its level of morale, especially within the complex and demanding modern environment. Soldiers need to feel that they matter and the NZ Soldier still needs to feel that he and his welfare environment are a priority and are being cared for. This will also bring out the best of the modern army as a whole.

Products: Cohesion, Espirit de Corps and Regimental Spirit

Cohesion or esprit de corps, along with regimental spirit, form a key part of any military organization, and the modern NZ Army is no different. Modern warfare is most definitely going to be a group activity and, as such, for a military organization to be effective, it must have strong group spirit, a spirit that will also enhance its combat power. Again, this is very relevant to the modern NZ Army. As has already been illustrated, there is a large degree of crossover or inter-relationship between certain aspects of the topic, and cohesion, esprit de corps, and regimental spirit are no exception.

The research highlighted a very definite link between cohesion or esprit de corps, regimental spirit and morale at both the individual and collective levels. It highlighted some of the benefits of good cohesion: feeling of pride, unity of purpose and feeling of belonging. It also tended to illustrate that, although a crossover of these aspects into influencing factors occurs, they appear to fit more comfortably as potential products of morale. W. M. Darryl Henderson illustrated this by his belief that unit cohesion is borne from small group cohesion and that small group cohesion is built on motivational norms, including morale and esprit de corps (1985, 4). Congressman Skelton takes it one step further in saying that esprit, cohesion, and morale combine to enhance combat effectiveness (1999, 3). These two key observations reinforce the link that exists between the three factors, and the vital role that they all play in generating and maintaining combat power and operational effectiveness. They also tend to support the theory that cohesion and esprit de corps are potential products of morale. Can cohesion and esprit de corps exist if morale does not? The NZ Army of the future will need to ensure that it is cognizant of this fact and attempt to maintain cohesion and esprit de corps by maintaining a focus on morale as it undergoes change. To not maintain cohesion may well cause retention and effectiveness difficulties that the army cannot afford.

The research also closely linked cohesion and esprit de corps with regimental spirit. The

regimental system with its associated spirit aspect of the modern NZ Army is also something that can enhance the esprit de corps of the force. There is little difference between the modern NZ Army and the British model, for example. The army's regimental model is based on the development of cohesion and esprit de corps, as well as an attempt to provide stability of personnel and experience within a unit. All of these factors should continue to illustrate the benefits of the regimental system while, at the same time, highlighting the problems that may occur when it is broken down. The regimental system and its associated spirit can therefore be seen as a contributor to cohesion and esprit de corps. As the army reorganizes, some units may well face disbandment or amalgamation and, therefore, may lose their regimental spirit and identity. While this may be necessary, the army needs to be aware of this fact and ensure that it takes measures to ensure that soldiers regain a degree of regimental spirit in their new organizations as soon as possible. To do this should ensure that cohesion and esprit de corps are not significantly degraded.

Cohesion, esprit de corps and its contributor, regimental spirit, are critical parts of the current NZ Army environment. It is likely, however, that they will become more critical when the modern environment is factored in and the army undergoes change. In order to nurture the benefits of cohesion and regimental spirit, the modern NZ Army must be aware of the results of these factors and the potential links that exist between them and morale in general, or the potential benefits may be degraded. The cohesion and esprit de corps of the modern NZ Army is going to be extremely dependent on the level of individual and collective morale of the force as a whole. From this, so will operational effectiveness.

Summary

The conclusions, assertions and trends that formed the basis of the research for this subordinate question in essence could be related to the NZ context. In most cases, there were

more similarities than differences and, as such, they gave an accurate reflection of the components, elements, and factors that make up and influence morale in NZ context. The analysis of this subordinate question concluded that the morale of the modern NZ army would be its collective state of mind and motivation to achieve set tasks or outputs. This was built on, and reinforced by, the analysis of the various elements and components of morale in a military context. This analysis also identified a number of factors that can and do influence morale and applied them to the NZ context. One key conclusion which forms the basis of the primary question analysis later in the thesis, was the degree of crossover and interrelationship that exists within the components, elements and potential products of morale. This also confirmed the complexity of the subject.

In summary, because of the close linkage between morale and the factors of leadership and discipline, and the role they all play in a military organization, if one were missing, the modern NZ Army would likely experience difficulties in meeting the challenges and changes ahead. Conversely, the army would do well ensuring that top down and bottom up information dissemination through effective communication within the modern NZ Army is maintained, along with challenging and demanding training to ensure that it can proficiently meet the demands that it will face. This is likely to lead to soldiers being confident and having trust in those around and above them and will all go a long way toward enhancing morale. In the wider context, the level and type of attention that the army receives in the future will undoubtedly shape its morale, as will the NZ Army's socio-economic relationship with the political and social aspects of NZ society. They will all play a role in determining the morale of the modern NZ Army and how the soldiers feel about their purpose and the role they play. Along with this, the welfare of the modern NZ Army and its wider family is going to be a vital component in determining its level of morale, especially within the complex and demanding modern environment. All of these

conclusions tend to lead to and support the assertion that the cohesion and esprit de corps of the modern NZ Army is going to be extremely dependent on the level of individual and collective morale of the force as a whole. In its component pieces, as concluded under this subordinate question, morale plays a vital role. The primary question's collective analysis further reinforced the vital role that morale plays in the modern NZ Army environment. This environment includes change and presents the modern NZ Army with a number of challenges.

What Are the Future Circumstances and Changes that May Influence Morale in the Modern NZ Army?

The Future Battlefield

The modern NZ army's future battlefield is likely to abide by those assertions highlighted in the research. It will be dispersed and highly mobile, place additional reliance on the small team, and depend on advanced technological material and expert leadership. This also highlights the point made by William Hauser that the soldier will be an integrated part of the combined arms and support services (Hauser 1980, 199-200). The general trend of the research also placed a degree of emphasis on the role that cohesive and well-trained units will play. The role that the human dimension will play on the future battlefield is clearly highlighted as being significant.

The future battlefield represents full-scale war or PSO. Although the modern NZ Army is more likely to face continuing commitments to PSO than war fighting, future PSO are likely to place increasing demands on the soldiers. It is accepted that, as highlighted in FM 100-23, PSO place different demands on the human dimension than does war fighting, however, these demands are no less significant. They also reflect the modern NZ Army environment with its associated challenges.

While the future battlefield has, to a certain degree, driven many of the pending changes, the human dimension is a vital component of this picture and must receive the army's attention as

a potentially critical part of the army's ability to operate effectively on the future battlefield.

Army Modernization

As stated above, much of the driving force behind army modernization is the battlefield of the future and its associated demands and requirements. This has driven the need to acquire modern, advanced technology and equipment and has, therefore, subsequently driven planned force restructures and reorganizations. All of this was reflected in the NZ government's future defense policy documents. The changing strategic environment that the modern NZ Army operates in, and will operate in the future has also forced the modernization program. This environment influences the outputs and ECs that the army must be able to perform. As outlined in *A Modern, Sustainable Defense Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs*, (May 2001), the ultimate aim of this modernization is to build a sustainable, affordable, modern, professional and well equipped NZDF able to meet NZ's objectives. One aspect of this modern environment that is not necessarily reflected is again the human dimension and the potential positive and negative impacts this process will have on the morale of the force. As already discussed, change can be disruptive, while, on the other hand, the replacement of old and unreliable equipment with new technology can increase morale.

As already discussed under the future battlefield, the human dimension, of which morale is a large part, will play a large role and, as such, is likely to play a large part in the modernization of the army. The implementation of the government's modernization policy will no doubt impact on this human dimension and, as such, will need to be considered.

Structure Reviews and Organizational Changes

Linked to and driven by the Army Modernization process are structural reviews and organizational changes. The Army 2005 organization will call for a number of structural reviews and organizational changes in order for it to meet desired capabilities. This is a fundamental

aspect of the NZ context and will reflect on the modern NZ Army environment. It is possible that this aspect will result in units being re-roled, and even disbanded. It is also likely to lead to personnel turbulence within the wider army. Some individuals may require retraining in order to undertake new roles in the modern NZ army. All of this may have a negative and degrading impact on the overall cohesion of the service.

Structural reviews and organizational changes do not solely reflect equipment and capability implementation, but are likely to impact on the human dimension also. This fact needs to be considered as part of the overall change strategy that faces the modern NZ Army. Doing this and maintaining a focus on the collective morale of the force may to a degree overcome and counter the negative impacts on the cohesion of the modern NZ Army.

Doctrine

Also indelibly linked to army modernization is doctrine. The doctrine of the modern NZ Army will reflect the new structures and organizations of the army in order to allow for the effective application of the improved capabilities. The future tactics, techniques, and procedures that will shape the employment of the modern NZ Army will reflect this doctrine. Doctrine is not only capabilities and equipment, the human dimension is also important in its application. The ability to apply the army's doctrine is linked to the cohesion and leadership of the army at all levels and the motivation of the soldiers while applying it in the real world. Doctrine will also

form the basis of all modern NZ Army training and employment and, therefore, its effective application is going to be critical to the operational effectiveness of the army.

The modern NZ Army's command philosophy of directive control, or, in American terms, mission command, and the operational level doctrine of maneuver warfare rely heavily on cohesion, initiative, trust, and leadership. All of these factors are also heavily linked to morale. It

is therefore likely that for the army to effectively apply its doctrine, the maintenance of morale and cohesion will play an important part in the process. By ensuring that doctrine reflects the importance of morale, cohesion, and leadership, the army is more likely to be capable of applying it effectively within the modern environment. This reflects the important role that leaders at all levels may play and reinforces the vital nature of leadership when considering morale.

Budget, Pay, and Human Resource Issues.

The NZ Army has recently published a key HR strategy that goes a long way to addressing a number of the 'human' issues of the future army. This, along with the government's increased focus on the army in the defense budget and its resultant recent pay rises, has resulted in a collective impression by many of a more human dimension focus to the future. It is, however, acknowledged that the increase in the defense budget will also have significant impacts on the overall modern NZ Army environment and can be clearly attributed to many of the other challenges and changes that were analyzed in this thesis.

Beyond 2010, NZ Army Human Resources Strategy (2001) places a great deal of emphasis on certain key aspects such as remuneration, recruitment, individual development (education and life skills training), career management, and retention, and through this it is possible to see a direct attempt to address a number of the possible real life issues that can influence a soldier's morale. While morale is not specifically stated in the strategy, it is heavily implied. It is the strategy's desire to both place the right people in the right place to make a difference and acknowledge the partnership between the individual and the organization that best reflects the positive outlook that is being mooted. This, reinforced by an apparent degree of support by government policy, will have a positive impact on morale, as it is also a key component of the army's overall modernization plan. It all goes some way to ensuring that the army's key asset, its soldiers, are factored into the future, and that as a result their individual and

collective morale can play a role in the effectiveness of the modern army.

Operational Tempo and Retention

One of the greatest challenges the modern NZ Army is likely to face is operational tempo. Currently the army is operating at a high level of operational tempo and this is reflected in the 2001 Ministry of Defense Report. This is having a profound impact on the army in general and is seeing some units having to re-role to compensate for capability versus requirement deficiencies. For example, the high level of operational tempo required the army to rerole its Armored and Artillery Regiments to form NZBATT 3, UNTAET, for East Timor service in 2000/2001 in order to meet this ongoing commitment (*NZBATT3, UNTAET Nov 2000 to May 2001 End of Tour Report*, 2001). It is likely that this level of operational tempo will continue for the foreseeable future and therefore will reflect the environment that the modern NZ Army will be required to operate in.

The small size of the NZ army is also a significant factor when assessed against the operational tempo reflected in the Ministry of Defense's 2001 annual report. Reflective of Congressman Skelton's assertions, high operational tempo has an adverse effect on retention within the army. As a result, fewer will be asked to do more, and endure longer periods of separation from their families. The NZ Army's HR Strategy identifies this as a concern and has identified possible steps to manage this issue. Notwithstanding, it is likely that the assertions made by Skelton are very applicable to the modern NZ Army. It is also likely to continue to ask the few to do more and more, even if it means that they are not employed in their chosen field or branch for lengthy periods. It is not hard to see the link between this situation and the potential retention problem. Skelton also reinforces the role that cohesion, morale, and leadership plays in dealing with this issue. The modern NZ Army needs to take heed of this point of view. A high level of morale in the modern NZ Army may go some way to countering the negative influences

of high operational tempo and help solve the retention issue.

Conversely, high operational tempo can have a positive impact on morale as soldiers are likely to be employed doing what they are trained for on real operational tours of duty. This also tends to give training a more focused edge. It is also likely to lead to an increase in recruiting as potential soldiers see the army as an operationally focused career as opposed to a training one. The difficulty is in achieving the fine line between the positive and negative aspects of operational tempo. The maintenance of morale may well be a possible solution and, as such, will require nurturing in this turbulent and busy environment.

Gender Integration

The army has already commenced the integration of females in all aspects of the modern NZ Army, including combat roles. This, therefore, is also reflective of the modern NZ Army environment where in the near future females will possibly make up 50 percent of the army's total strength (*DFO(A)* Volume 1 2000, ii). This also reflects the army's drive for equal employment opportunities for all its personnel and is in accordance with NZ social trends. There is some debate whether females in combat roles may degrade an army's operational effectiveness, cohesion, and morale. In the NZ context, however, it is more likely that the method in which this process is undertaken will determine whether this is the case, and to what degree.

In his thesis "Gender Integration in the NZ Infantry," Major Rogers summarizes this issue very well and contends that there is no real proof that gender integration will have an adverse effect on the cohesion and morale of the modern NZ Army. He does, however, point out a number of circumstances that could cause problems, such as sexual harassment and perceived double standards with its associated impacts on the male element of the army. Part of Rogers' thesis is that the maintenance of morale and cohesion, coupled with strong leadership, will go some way to ensuring that this process is managed effectively and that, rather than seeing morale

and cohesion as being negatively influenced by it, they can be used as tools to ensure that the army maintains and enhances its effectiveness during the integration process. This may go some way to undermining the negative impact of this issue and enhance the positive contribution that the NZ female soldier can make to the modern NZ Army.

Maori Culture Integration

The final aspect of the modern NZ Army environment requiring analysis was the integration of the Maori culture into the army. The intent of the integration is to enhance the cohesion and esprit de corps of the NZ Army through its unique cultural heritage and history. The first steps of making the army a family or tribe to which all belong has given the modern NZ Army a unique identity and is likely to further develop the pride and warrior spirit of the wider army.

This identity is something that is likely to also stem into the international environment as the Army continues to operate overseas as “Ngati Tumatauenga” and it draws on the rich history of Maori soldiers in wars gone by. The possibility also exists that this initiative may go some way to forming a model or basis for a more progressive integration of the Maori culture in the wider NZ society. There is a degree of disharmony in NZ society in terms of the Maori culture; however, this disharmony is not evident in army community. This is a result of the army's understanding of the benefits and advantages of cultural integration. Therefore, it is possible that

the Army cultural integration may have wider positive impacts which, in turn, could benefit the army as a whole.

This initiative is likely to undergo further enhancement over the coming years as it continues to be inculcated throughout the army and its soldiers. It is also contended that this initiative can only have a positive impact on the overall cohesion and esprit de corps of the

modern NZ Army. Through this, a sense of belonging and oneness is likely to have a positive impact on both the individual and collective morale of the army.

Summary

The modern NZ Army faces a number of challenges and changes that will have an impact on morale, both positive and negative, and to varying degrees. In essence, however, the environment that the army faces will require a focus on morale and the other aspects of the army's human dimension, such as cohesion, esprit de corps, and leadership. This is due to the assertion that morale and its associated components, elements, and products may go some way to overcoming some of the challenges that the face the army and negating some of the impacts they may have on the effectiveness of the army.

In summary, the modern army's environmental impacts analyzed under this subordinate question can be grouped into two broad areas: army modernization issues, and personnel issues. The largest group of challenges is driven by army modernization, which in turn, is being driven by the likely state of the future battlefield. Army modernization and its associated challenges, such as structural reviews, organizational changes, and doctrinal issues, all link together and all possess aspects that can negatively influence the morale of the Army if they are not managed effectively. The disruption and turbulence caused by the introduction of new equipment and new organizations, coupled with the demands of modern doctrine, are a likely by-product of the process in order to ensure that the modern NZ Army is effective in the dispersed, highly technical, mobile, and challenging future battlefield. In order to be prepared to accept and manage these challenges, a focus on the human dimension, including leadership, morale and its components and products is likely to be vital. This is, therefore, likely to ensure that the army can implement the changes, apply the technology, and meet the capability requirements in order for it to be operationally effective on the modern future battlefield.

On the personnel, side, the issues of budget, pay, HR, operational tempo and retention, gender and cultural integration present different factors to consider. Budget, pay, and HR issues, along with gender and cultural integration, are being undertaken in an attempt to enhance the morale of the army, while operational tempo, and its associated impact on retention present real challenges to the morale and cohesion of the army. One thing they all have in common is that they tend to reflect an impact on both the individual and collective personnel environment of the modern NZ Army, and, therefore, require a high degree of focus on the human dimension of the army. As has been said before, the soldier is the most valuable asset to the army, not only as an individual but also as collective units, as they are the ones going to be charged with implementing the changes driven by the future environment, as well as being an integral part of it. It also goes some way to highlighting the importance of morale in the modern NZ Army, but in order to build on and reinforce this assertion, it is necessary to collectively analyze *all* the conclusions made under the three subordinate questions. To do this will answer the primary question; is morale critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army?

Is Morale Critical to the Operational Effectiveness of the Modern NZ Army?

It became increasingly evident throughout the research and analysis that there is a large degree of crossover and interrelationship between morale, its components and elements, the factors influencing morale, and its potential products. In order to capture these and apply the subsequent conclusions to those conclusions made that reflect the modern NZ Army, the application of the NZ Army Morale Model at figure 2 was used to answer whether morale was indeed critical to the effectiveness of the modern NZ Army.

Morale in terms of the modern NZ Army has been defined as the collective state of mind and motivation to achieve set tasks or outputs. An obvious component of this is individual morale that is an integral part of the *collective* aspect. The analysis suggested that the collective

aspect could not exist without a strong foundation of individual morale within the soldiers of the force. Individual morale is characterized by courage, devotion to duty, pride, self-confidence, satisfaction, motivation, and unselfishness. The subsequent collective results are comradeship ('mateship' in the ANZAC sense), loyalty, mutual respect, and moral support to each other, and the nobility and belief in the cause for which a soldier serves and fights. These, along with the definition of the modern NZ Army's morale, form the center piece of the morale model and, as such, need to be kept in mind throughout the collective analysis process, for all other aspects of the analysis either influence it or are dependent on it.

The first of the influential factors that required analysis was also the one that generated the most interaction and crossover with the others. Discipline and leadership play a vital bilateral role in the determination of morale and, as has been shown by the analysis of this area, are not necessarily the easiest to quantify. In terms of morale, many still argue whether discipline breeds morale or morale breeds discipline. It is felt that this argument is moot, as either way morale and discipline depend on each other. In terms of leadership, it is not difficult to make the correlation between the level of morale of the force and the effectiveness of the leadership in that force. In summary therefore, it is contended that if one of morale, discipline, or leadership were lacking, the others would be adversely affected. Apart from morale, these factors also impact and influence soldier welfare, training, and communications and information dissemination. They also play a part in determining operational effectiveness and cohesion, as well as sometimes being included as components or elements of morale.

In terms of their relationship together, leadership builds and fosters discipline and discipline leverages leadership. They are fundamentally interrelated and dependent on each other. With regards to welfare, soldier welfare in the NZ context is a function of leadership and is the responsibility of all in positions of command. Therefore, the effectiveness of the welfare system, with its resultant impacts on morale, directly correlates to leadership. Also, soldiers who

believe that the system is tending to their needs are more likely to accept the rigors of military discipline, thereby enhancing not only discipline in general, but also leadership.

Leadership and discipline also influence training. Effective training is a leadership function and efficiency of training is dependent on a high level of discipline. On the other side of the bilateral relationship, challenging and demanding training at all levels will solidify discipline and leverage leadership through trust and confidence. Again, there is a close association between the three: leadership, discipline, and training.

In terms of communications and information dissemination, this again is a critical function of leadership. Commanders at all levels have a responsibility to keep all of their subordinates informed of all relevant factors and information pertaining to them and is a top down and bottom up process. The bilateral aspect is that good communications leads to better discipline and will greatly assist in the leadership and command process. A disciplined approach to intra-organization communications can only enhance the overall leadership of the organization and go some way to ensuring that discipline is maintained to the highest level. There are many crossovers existing between discipline and leadership, morale and other influencing factors, and as such, leadership and discipline are going to be a vital aspect of the effectiveness of the modern NZ Army, as well as its morale.

As has been highlighted, communications and information dissemination share a close bilateral relationship with discipline and leadership. Their relationship with morale is also bilateral. Good communications ensures that the soldiers know their purpose, have a sense of belonging, feel that they can make a valued contribution, and will be listened to when the situation arises. This can only positively enhance individual and collective morale. In terms of morale's relationship to communications, good morale in an organization is likely to encourage the unrestricted and effective flow of information and generate good communications amongst all in the service. This, in turn, is likely to lead to a greater degree of efficiency and effectiveness in

the organization as a whole.

The discussion of training under leadership and discipline focused on the bilateral relationship between it and discipline and leadership. In terms of the bilateral relationship between it and morale, challenging, demanding, effective, and efficient training builds trust, confidence, and proficiency in the organization that, in turn, can only enhance morale. Poor, ineffective, and unfocused training would certainly degrade morale. A high level of morale is also likely to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of training as the soldiers may well be highly motivated and more receptive to greater demands and challenges in training. It is therefore suggested that one cannot train morale, but one can train *for* morale. By doing this the flow on effects are likely to improve cohesion and, most definitively, operational effectiveness.

In terms of social and political influences, the morale of the force, both collectively and individually, is influenced by the relative worth of the force as perceived by those it serves. A negative image in the eyes of NZ society, coupled with a perceived lack of political support, is likely to lower morale. Soldiers need to feel that they are making a valued contribution to NZ society and are supported by the politicians. How the army is perceived and its socio-political place in NZ society will continue to shape its morale and, as such, its effectiveness.

Soldier welfare is one of those factors that is readily associated with morale and is often given as the reason for the lack of morale should welfare be overlooked. It is a fact of looking after a soldier, his family, and his welfare needs by ensuring that his welfare environment is considered. By not doing this, it is not hard to see how this can adversely impact on individual and, therefore, collective morale. A solid, sound welfare system attending to the complete welfare needs of the force will enhance the force's morale while high morale will enhance the welfare system by placing fewer demands on it and ensuring that it can be focused in the right areas. This bilateral relationship reinforces the role that soldier welfare has with morale and operational effectiveness.

The above analysis of the many factors that influence morale in the modern NZ Army illustrated the crossover and interrelationship they have with each other, on the collective state of mind and motivation of the army to achieve set tasks or outputs, and with the other components of the modern NZ Army's morale. This is regardless of whether the influence is focused at individual or collective morale, as the analysis has suggest that these two aspects of morale are also fundamentally linked. It is therefore theorized that the collective interrelationship suggests that morale is the common denominator of all the influencing factors. Morale results from the positive application of the factors discussed and forms a conduit that produces the products of cohesion and esprit de corps, and through these operational effectiveness.

Previous analysis of cohesion, and esprit de corps suggested that there is an important relationship between these aspects and morale. It also suggested that this relationship supports the conclusion that cohesion and esprit de corps are products of a high level of morale in a military organization. This is further reinforced by the conclusion made in the analysis of this topic that suggested that cohesion and esprit de corps of the modern NZ Army are going to be extremely dependent on the level of individual and collective morale. It is not hard to understand the vital role that esprit de corps and cohesion play in a military organization. Esprit de corps is an element that enhances cohesion and is borne out of collective morale that is determined by the influencing factors. These three factors are fundamentally linked, and it is, therefore, likely that without a firm, sound basis of collective morale, esprit de corps and cohesion are going to be degraded.

This degradation is therefore likely to also degrade operational effectiveness, or the modern NZ Army's ability to achieve all stated outputs and employment context both in preparation in peace and execution while on operations. This definition of operational effectiveness relies on the army's level of leadership and training, its ability to employ operational doctrine, and its ability to manage the changing environment while maintaining its operational

edge. The relationship between cohesion and esprit de corps and operational effectiveness can be summarized by the fact that cohesive units are better able to generate the combat or fighting power necessary to meet outputs, while also being better able to implement change. This reflects the modern NZ Army's definition of operational effectiveness. It is therefore clear that, without cohesion and esprit de corps the ability of the modern NZ Army to achieve operational effectiveness will be inhibited. A flow on from operational effectiveness as characterized by mission success is a positive impact on cohesion and morale. When the modern NZ Army achieves success in operations and in peacetime, positive spin-offs are likely to reinforce and enhance group cohesion and individual and collective morale. This, to a certain extent, closes the loop of cohesion and esprit de corps, operational effectiveness, operational success and morale, all of which have their basis on morale.

The final aspect of the collective analysis was to apply the above analysis to the modern NZ Army environment as characterized by the previously analyzed changes and challenges. The important aspect here was to highlight the role that morale is going to play in facilitating the effective meeting of challenges and implementation of changes. Notwithstanding, it was accepted that these changes and challenges would impact on all the listed factors and thereby have an impact on the morale of the modern NZ Army. Analysis under the relevant subordinate question addressed the issue of the impact these circumstances will have on the morale of the force. In summary, however, the eight challenges or changes analyzed present both potential problems and benefits for the morale of the army. The need is to identify these, be aware of the implications, lessen the negative impacts, and enhance the positive facets. The key now is to be fully aware that a solid morale based foundation for the modern NZ Army is likely to play a large role in determining the success of the army's ability to adapt to the modern army environment. The morale of the force is again likely to be a common denominator in an environment that includes the ability to meet both the modernization challenges and changes, as well as apply the

personnel changes while maintaining a focus on operational effectiveness.

Summary.

By way of summary, the complex interrelationship between morale, its components and those influencing factors reinforced the 'central' role that morale plays. Many of these relationships are bilateral, which again reinforced the vital role that morale plays. By also accepting the many individual and collective components and elements of morale, it is easy to understand why morale fulfills this role. By also suggesting that critical products of sound morale are cohesion and esprit de corps, it is again easy to see how morale plays a vital role in developing and maintaining this necessary facet of a military organization. Finally, linking cohesion with operational effectiveness directly traced the impact of morale on the army's ability to meet its directed outputs and importantly its ability to meet the demands and challenges of the modern NZ army environment. As has been illustrated, morale plays a central role in the modern NZ Army and, as such, *is* critical to its operational effectiveness now and in the future.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In war, everything depends on morale, and morale and public opinion comprise the better part of reality” (Fitton, Ed 1990, 194)

Napoleon I
Napoleon's Military Maxims

The modern NZ Army faces a period of significant change, change that will create challenges to the operational effectiveness of the service. By its very nature the modern NZ Army will obviously rely on its soldiers to both meet these challenges and be operationally effective when called on to deploy for operational service. This reflects the critical nature of the human dimension of the Army. The analysis of the research determined that morale is a central foundation or conduit for the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army. It

focused on the macrolevel in order to determine whether morale is critical and why rather than look at the microlevel in terms of how to physically grow and maintain morale. This macro level analysis established the importance of morale to the modern NZ Army, particularly against the modern environmental background. The analysis also formed a number of conclusions from which recommendations were drawn. Hence, the purpose of this chapter was to first summarize the key conclusions as to why morale is critical to the modern NZ Army. Second, the author made several recommendations that fell out of the conclusions with specific reference to the role morale will play in the modern environment and suggested areas requiring further study and research on the subject of morale.

Conclusions

This researcher found that morale is a critical component in achieving operational effectiveness, or the modern NZ Army's capability to meet all operational outputs and ECs contained in NZDF and NZ government strategic direction, both in peace and war. It was also central to organizing, controlling, and integrating all aspects of the organization within the modern NZ Army environment. Operational effectiveness will see the modern army being well led, possessing experienced leaders, and being well trained, while at the same time being able to apply its operational doctrine in the form of principles and tenets in order to generate combat or fighting power and achieve mission success in operational situations. The modern NZ Army will also be capable of effective and efficient management and implementation of change in order to meet the associated challenges. Morale, or the NZ Army's collective state of mind and motivation to achieve set tasks or outputs will play a critical part in achieving this. As an adjunct to this, like the US ARUS, the current OPRES system does not accurately reflect the important role that the human dimension plays in the modern integrated army and as such does not give a full picture of the army's potential effectiveness.

The NZ Army's morale relied on various components that built both individual and collective morale. It was considered impossible to have collective morale, characterized by loyalty, mutual respect, and comradeship (mateship), without a firm foundation of the individual morale components, such as courage, devotion, motivation, and a sense of duty. In the context of the modern NZ Army environment, this was considered in a time when the soldiers may question their purpose, the battlefield is more sophisticated, and the role of leaders at all levels is increasingly vital.

Many factors will influence the morale of the modern army but, more importantly, the morale of the modern army may well influence these factors also. It was this bilateral inter-relationship and crossover that formed the basis of the critical role morale plays. Of the five

factor groups analyzed (discipline and leadership, communications and information dissemination, training, soldier welfare, and social and political influences), only the last factor could not support a bilateral interrelationship. All others impacted on morale and morale impacted on them, for the most part in a positive way. Discipline and leadership play a vital role and their bilateral relationship with morale provides the strongest impact, which was not surprising given their close association. The analysis also concluded that if one of discipline, leadership, or morale, was missing, the others would be significantly degraded, and, as such, the modern NZ Army may well face difficulties. Communications and information dissemination, training, and soldier welfare all impact on morale positively if encouraged, effectively conducted, or maintained. It impacted negatively if stifled, inefficiently focused, or overlooked. On the other hand, morale's impact is considered as having a positive and enhancing influence on these factors, which, in turn, would encourage positive application with commensurate positive results throughout the army. In terms of social and political influences, it was concluded the morale of the force would have little impact on this factor, but that it would be significantly influenced by it. The degree to which NZ society and its government supports the modern NZ Army will play a large role in determining its collective morale in the future.

The author concluded that cohesion and esprit de corps were likely products of good morale and that they had their foundation in the morale of the force. The analysis theorized that unit cohesion and esprit de corps could not exist without solid collective morale and that the NZ Army's regimental spirit, a by product of the British regimental system, contributed directly to collective cohesion and esprit de corps. There was also a bilateral relationship in that morale formed the basis for cohesion, and cohesion created the conditions that encouraged and enhanced morale at the individual and collective levels. Morale is critical to cohesion, which, in turn, plays a vital role in a military organization's ability to operate effectively. This further reinforced morale's importance to the modern NZ Army.

As has been stated on a number of occasions, the future environment in which the modern NZ Army will be called upon to operate in is going to involve significant change and present a number of challenges. The future battlefield will impact all facets of the military environment, none more so than the human aspect. The same can be said for the army's modernization program that includes changes in its doctrine, structures, and organizations, all of which will place pressures on the soldiers of the army and, in turn, may impact the effectiveness of the force as a whole. In terms of personnel issues, the army faces a high level of operational tempo and retention and recruitment issues. These combine to place an increased burden on those that stay in the service, seeing fewer doing more, particularly given the above army modernization issues. The NZDF and NZ Army are both attempting to address potential personnel issues through budget and pay increases and a long term HR strategy, all aimed at improving the human environment of the modern NZ Army. Gender and cultural integration are supporting pillars to the human environment and, although they both present challenges, both will enhance this environment in the long term. It is against this backdrop that the author concluded that individual and collective morale is likely to play a vital role in ensuring that the NZ Army meets these challenges and ultimately manages its modern environment. By doing this, it is likely that the overall operational effectiveness of the army will be enhanced and strengthened.

The collective analysis of the complete picture, particularly the way all the parts inter-related further developed the significance of the role morale plays, especially when viewed from a holistic view of the environment of the modern NZ Army. The collective analysis used the NZ Army Morale Model and brought all the pieces together. First, the interrelationship between the factors that influence morale showed that there was significant crossover and interaction, specifically with discipline and leadership. This factor not only influenced morale but also shared a bilateral relationship with training, welfare, and communications and information dissemination. This reinforced the vital role that these two aspects had in the complete picture

and, by association, the critical role morale played. Second, morale, both individual and collective, as characterized by their respective components, appeared to form the conduit through which positive influences flowed to build cohesion and esprit de corps, two very necessary aspects of any military organization. It also appeared to be the main element that could counter the negative influences that may occur if the principal factors were not positively applied. This further reinforced the conclusion that positive individual morale bred positive collective morale, which, in turn, formed the foundation for positive collective unit cohesion and esprit de corps.

Having concluded morale's vital role in cohesion, the next step of the thesis was to conclude that cohesion was a vital foundation for operational effectiveness and that degraded cohesion would most likely lead to degraded operational effectiveness. When applied to the definition of the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness, cohesive units will be better able to apply doctrine, implement change, and maintain experienced and well-trained force elements. The logical conclusion to close the circle was that, through the achievement of operational effectiveness that is characterized by mission success, the flow on would most likely be a positive and enhancing impact on cohesion, esprit de corps, and morale, an impact that would most likely spread down through the entire model.

The final aspect of the collective analysis was to apply the above conclusions against the modern environment characterized by modernization and personnel issues. By looking at this environment, the thesis concluded that morale would play a critical role in overcoming challenges and adapting to the modern environment. This conclusion led to many of the recommendations below, which, in turn, were based on the relevant factor or component piece of the morale model. In essence, the author concluded that the collective power of the model, with morale as its central point, conduit, or, in some cases, the foundation, would be vital to determining the army's ability to adapt to the modern environment while maintaining operational effectiveness. This conclusion again further reinforced the overall conclusion of the thesis that for the modern NZ Army to

remain operationally effective morale is going to play a critical role.

Areas for Further Study

Further study should concentrate on looking in detail at tools and systems that will assist the army's leadership to identify ways to grow and maintain morale at all levels across the force. This should be aimed at achieving quantifiable and tangible measures to ensure that the critical nature of morale to the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness is physically realized. This is likely to involve taking some of the conclusions made in this thesis and exploring them deeper in order to produce workable systems, programs, and/or tools to extenuate the positives of morale within the specific areas. This piece-by-piece process should build on the holistic conclusions made in this thesis and produce a robust and comprehensive system aimed at enhancing and maintaining the entire modern army's morale and, therefore, its operational effectiveness.

Second, a study should be conducted on how to best measure the human dimension in the preparedness reporting system. This would involve the establishment of a broad standardized set of criteria to allow commanders to qualitatively assess the status of the unit's leadership, cohesion, and morale. This will enable commanders, particularly at unit and formation level, to meet their responsibility of assessing and reporting on the human dimension.

Recommendations

Based on the above conclusions, the researcher made the following recommendations:

1. Given the importance of morale and the human dimensions, the NZ Army OPRES system should be reviewed to include more reference of this dimension so that the preparedness and potential effectiveness of the modern NZ Army is accurately and more completely reflected in the results.
2. It is suggested that the modern NZ Army should ensure that its change process recognizes the impact that this process will have on the human dimension and that it should manage this change with this in mind, while at the same time remaining operationally effective.
3. It is likely that the NZ Army of the present and the future will benefit from taking measures to ensure that it maintains the necessary experience and trained state through sound multilevel leadership and effective and efficient multilevel training.
4. The NZ Army leadership at all levels should be made aware of the impact that discipline, leadership, communications and information dissemination, training, soldier welfare, and social and political influences will have on the modern NZ Army. They should develop tools and systems to enhance the positive and counter the negative impacts of not only these factors but also others that may be identified.
5. In line with the above recommendations, it is suggested that leaders at all levels should be made acutely aware of the pending changes and challenges and the potential impacts they can have on morale, cohesion, and ultimately operational effectiveness in order to better understand the role that morale will play in meeting these challenges.
6. Finally, the modern NZ Army as a collective entity, would do well to recognize the potential power of morale and should be educated in the critical role it will play now and in the future, and subsequently undertake efforts to reinforce the force's morale.

Summary

This thesis has spent time exploring the importance of morale to the modern NZ Army by using a deliberate process based on the three subordinate questions. The process was complex and, where necessary, the thesis compartmentalized aspects of the research and analysis. It is worth noting at this point that, although the thesis has concluded that morale *is* critical to the operational effectiveness of the modern NZ Army, it is a very complex and wide reaching subject. The purpose of this thesis was to attempt to determine just how important morale was and why. Morale, in its holistic form, is going to play a vital role in determining the army's ability to meet the challenges it faces and, fundamentally, its level of operational effectiveness. Because of this, simply put, morale is important, indeed critically important, to the modern NZ Army's operational effectiveness, now and into the future.

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